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Abstract
We study how the management practices that bureaucrats operate under, correlate to the
quantity and quality of public services delivered. We do so in a developing country context,
exploiting data from the Nigerian Civil Service linking public sector organizations to the
projects they are responsible for. For each of 4700 projects, we have hand coded independent
engineering assessments of each project’s completion rate and delivered quality. We supple-
ment this information with a survey to elicit management practices for bureaucrats in the
63 civil service organizations responsible for these projects, following the approach of Bloom
and Van Reenen [2007]. Management practices matter: a one standard deviation increase
in autonomy for bureaucrats corresponds to significantly higher project completion rates of
18%; a one standard deviation increase in practices related to incentives and monitoring cor-
responds to significantly lower project completion rates of 14%. We provide evidence that the
negative impacts of practices related to incentive provision/monitoring arise because bureau-
crats multi-task and incentives are poorly targeted, and because these management practices
capture elements of subjective performance evaluation that further leave scope for dysfunc-
tional responses from bureaucrats. The backdrop to these results, where 38% of projects are
never started, implies there are potentially large gains to marginally changing management
practices for bureaucrats.
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1 Introduction
We study the correlates of effective public service delivery in an important developing country con-
text: Nigeria. To do so, we combine data sources linking the outputs of government bureaucracies
with details of how bureaucrats are managed. On outputs, we use project level data measuring
the completion, quality and complexity of over 4700 public sector projects implemented by orga-
nizations in the Nigerian civil service, including government ministries and other federal agencies.
On management, we adapt the methodology set out in Bloom and Van Reenen [2007] to mea-
sure management practices for bureaucrats in each organization, along multiple dimensions. Our
study sheds light on the relationship between the management practices for bureaucrats in each
organization, and the quantity and quality of projects delivered by the organization.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the effective functioning of the bureaucracy is an impor-
tant determinant of poverty, inequality, and economic growth as stressed by the state capabilities
literature [Besley and Persson 2010]. Effective public service delivery also matters from a microe-
conomic perspective: program evaluations of micro-scale interventions are often partly motivated
by the assumption that successful interventions can be faithfully scaled-up by governments.
However, despite the importance of government effectiveness for citizen welfare, the public
administration literature is almost devoid of concrete evidence linking practices in civil service
organizations to public goods outcomes [Goldfinch et al. 2012]. At the same time, economic anal-
yses of incentives in the public sector have largely focused either on the selection and motivation
of politicians [Besley 2004, Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013], or on the response to incentives of
frontline staff such as teachers and health workers [Glewwe et al. 2010, Muralidharan and Sun-
dararaman 2011, Duflo et al. 2012, Ashraf et al. 2012, Miller and Babiarz 2013]. In both rich
and poor country contexts, there is little evidence linking the managerial practices that the vital
middle-tier of bureaucrats operate under, to public service delivery. It is this gap we start to fill.
Banerjee et al. [2007] highlight two constraints restricting research on public good provision in
developing countries: (i) the process of project implementation is rarely quantifiable; (ii) public
good quality is difficult to measure. The data we utilize allows us to make progress on both issues.
More precisely, we exploit a unique period of history in the Nigerian civil service, during which
the activities of public organizations were subject to detailed and independent scrutiny. As part of
this process, quantitative information was collected to measure the actual implementation success
and quality of public sector projects in various social sectors. The scrutineers were independent
teams of engineers and members of civil society.
We have hand coded this information to obtain potentially unbiased assessments of individual
project completion rates and their quality, for over 4700 public sector projects that began in
2006/7. The bulk of project types we study are construction projects, such as boreholes, buildings,
dams and roads. We have also used the technical documents available for each project, to work
with engineers to construct measures of each project’s complexity, following engineering best-
practice [Remington and Pollack 2007]. The aggregate budgetary cost of the projects we study is
US$800 million or 8% of all social spending in Nigeria over this period.
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To measure the management practices that bureaucrats operate under, we follow the method-
ological approach set out in Nick Bloom and John Van Reenen’s pioneering work [Bloom and Van
Reenen 2007, 2010]. We adapt their management surveys to the Nigerian public sector setting,
taking account of insights from the public administration literature [Rose-Ackerman 1986, Wilson
1989]. We collected data on management practices for 63 organizations of the Federal Civil Service
in Nigeria, including central ministries and regional development authorities. For each organiza-
tion, we derive three measures of management practices: one broadly related to the autonomy
provided to bureaucrats; one related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureaucrats;
and one capturing multiple other aspects of management practices.
The autonomy index we construct captures the extent to which: (i) bureaucrats can input
into policy formulation and implementation processes; (ii) the flexibility with which an agency
can re-organize its bureaucrats to respond to best practice and project peculiarities. There are
long-standing views in the public administration literature on the importance of autonomy. As
Rose-Ackerman [1986] describes, at one extreme lies the view that public agencies ought to delegate
as much decision making to bureaucrats as possible, relying on their professionalism and resolve
to deliver public services [Simon 1983]. At the other extreme lies the Weberian view that, because
the objectives of bureaucracies and society diverge, only an entirely rules-based system of public
administration, that leaves little to the individual judgement of bureaucrats, can ensure consistent
and acceptable levels of public service. The second reason to focus on autonomy stems from the
economics of organizations literature. Despite the early prominence of autonomy in this literature
[Simon 1951], and the recent contribution of Aghion and Tirole [1997] that has revitalized interest
in discretion in organizations, little evidence exists on the causes and consequences of providing
autonomy in organizations. Our analysis also starts to fill this gap.
The incentives/monitoring based management index we construct captures the extent to which
an organization collects indicators of project performance, how these indicators are reviewed,
and whether bureaucrats are rewarded for achievements reflected in these indicators. This is an
important dimension of management practices given the literature on incentive theory stressing
the positive impacts performance incentives and monitoring have on organizational performance.
However, a priori the impacts of such incentives in public sector settings is uncertain because: (i)
bureaucrats might need to engage multiple effort types, not all of which are measurable; (ii) the
process by which inputs are converted to outputs is uncertain; (iii) there can be competing views
on the right way to implement bureaucratic outputs; (iv) bureaucratic objectives are not clear cut;
(v) performance incentives might crowd out the intrinsic motivation of those self-selected into the
public sector [Perry and Wise 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008].1
1Positive impacts of performance pay for teachers have been documented using RCTs in developing countries by
Glewwe et al. [2010], Muralidharan and Sundararaman [2011], and Duflo et al. [2012], although Fryer [2013] finds
zero or even negative impacts in the US. In health, a nascent literature documents positive impacts of performance
pay in developing countries when provided to frontline workers [Miller and Babiarz 2013]. In line with our findings,
Ashraf et al. [2012] document how non-monetary incentives elicit more effort than monetary incentives for such
tasks. Perry et al. [2009] and Hasnain et al. [2012] present literature reviews suggesting a lack of evidence
that incentives positively impact bureaucrat behaviors. Muralidharan [2012] provides extensive discussions of why
performance related pay might be specifically suboptimal in the public sector.
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We probe these issues by exploiting a third data source: a survey we fielded to a representative
sample to over 4100 civil servants, corresponding to 13% of the total workforce of the 63 organiza-
tions we study. This asked bureaucrats questions related to their tenure and intrinsic motivation,
their perceptions of corruption in the organization, and their employment histories as bureaucrats.
We use this evidence both to shed light on how the impacts of management practice vary with
bureaucrat characteristics, and also to address econometric concerns related to non-random sort-
ing of bureaucrats into organizations as a function of the management practices in place, or the
endogenous determination of management practices as a function of bureaucrat characteristics.
Central to our empirical method is that, for any given project type, multiple organizations are
observed conducting similar project activities. For example, small-scale dams are constructed by
the federal ministries of water, agriculture, and environment. We therefore assess how the delivery
of the same project type varies depending on the management practices in place for bureaucrats
in the specific organization responsible, holding constant all other project characteristics, such as
their complexity and scale, as well as other characteristics of the organization and bureaucrats.
We present three core findings linking civil service management practices and public service
delivery in Nigeria. First, the management practices bureaucrats operate under matter. Despite
the measures of management practice related to autonomy and performance incentives being posi-
tively correlated to each other, they have opposing correlations with the quantity of public service
delivery: a one standard deviation increase in autonomy for bureaucrats corresponds to signifi-
cantly higher project completion rates of 18%, and a one standard deviation increase in practices
related to incentives/monitoring corresponds to significantly lower project completion rates of
14%. Moreover, we find management practices correlate to quality-adjusted project completion
rates in similar ways as documented for project completion rates. The backdrop to these findings
in Nigeria, where 38% of public projects are never even started, implies these magnitudes are of
economic as well as statistical significance. If these findings reflect causal impacts, they suggest
the potential gains to marginally changing management practices are huge.
At face value, the interpretation of our findings on autonomy for bureaucrats provide support
to the notion that public agencies ought to delegate some decision making to bureaucrats, relying
on their professionalism and resolve to deliver public services [Simon 1983]. The evidence is
less supportive of the notion that when bureaucrats have more agency or organizations are more
flexibly structured, then they are more likely to pursue their own objectives that diverge from
societal interests, resulting in fewer public services being delivered.
The robust negative correlation we document between project completion rates and manage-
ment practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureaucrats, is far more
surprising and counter to a large body of evidence from private sector settings. The interpretation
of this result is nuanced because we measure management practices related to the provision of
incentives and monitoring: we do not measure the use of explicit compensation schemes based on
output or project completion. As such, the detrimental impacts of such practices for bureaucrats
can be interpreted in at least two ways.
First, bureaucrats might operate in a classic multi-tasking environment, in which they exert
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multiple types of effort, only some of which generate productive outcomes such as public projects
being completed [Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991]. Other efforts that bureaucrats engage in might
be termed ‘processing’, or ‘ticking boxes’. In essence, our management practice measure might
then capture an incentive system that places excessive regulatory burden or ‘red tape’ on bureau-
crats, that has long been argued to lead bureaucrats to mis-allocate effort towards such processing
activities [Kelman 1990]. As management practices in bureaucracies become more overtly con-
cerned with incentivizing and monitoring such processing efforts (perhaps because they are much
less costly to specify or monitor than more productive types of bureaucrat effort), then bureaucrats
will optimally reallocate effort toward such activities, reducing project completion rates overall.
A second interpretation of the negative impact management practices related to performance
incentives and monitoring have in this bureaucratic setting is that the practices we measure pick
up subjective performance evaluation (SPE), rather than explicit incentives based on signals of
productive effort/output. While SPE has the benefit of being based on a more rounded set of
assessments, it is well known that such subjective assessments also give rise to other biases and
dysfunctional responses, especially the desire of agents to engage in influencing activities to curry
favor with supervisors [Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988]. If so, the increased use of such
mis-targeted incentives and key performance indicators can also lead to bureaucrats reallocating
effort towards non-productive tasks, thus reducing project completion rates overall.
To understand whether the incentive/monitoring related management practices we measure
capture elements of multi-tasking or SPE, our second set of results explores how the impacts of
management practices vary with project and organizational characteristics. We document the
negative impact of incentive based practices are even more negative for: (i) more complex projects
(that might reflect multiple effort types needing to be exerted); (ii) for projects that organizations
implement less frequently and might be less specialized in; (iii) project types that our independent
engineering assessments code as being of inherently greater ambiguity or uncertainty in design
and implementation. Also in line with the interpretation that incentives are mis-targeted or
subjectively determined in this context we find that the negative impacts of performance-incentive
practices are ameliorated in organizations: (i) that give more discretion to bureaucrats as measured
by our index of management practices along this dimension; (ii) with better IT facilities, that
might capture their greater ability to measure and target incentives towards the most productive
efforts bureaucrats engage in; (iii) staffed by less experienced bureaucrats, that might reflect that
bureaucrats learn how to engage in influence activities with experience.
Our third class of results shed new light on the interplay between management practices and
bureaucrat characteristics. We first address the literature suggesting performance-based incentives
might crowd out the intrinsic motivation of public sector workers. We find the negative impact
of performance-based incentives is offset by the share of bureaucrats in the civil service organi-
zation that are intrinsically motivated. Hence, if anything, our evidence suggests crowding-in of
bureaucrat effort in the presence of practices related to incentives/monitoring.
While the recent economics literature has emphasized the role of intrinsic motivation, a long-
standing literature in public administration emphasizes that civil servants pursue their self-interest
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[Tullock 1965, Wilson 1989]. This more negative view of bureaucrats spurs our final set of results,
that explore how the impacts of management practices are mediated through perceptions of cor-
ruption among civil service organizations, as elicited in our civil servant survey. Clearly, in the
context of Nigerian bureaucracies the issue of corruption cannot be ignored, and it permeates
throughout our analysis. We find a large negative levels impact on completion rates of percep-
tions of corruption in organizations, but the negative impacts of performance-based incentives do
not vary with perceptions of corruption. This suggests that corruption is certainly prevalent in
this environment, but that there are few bureaucrats that are actually prevented from behaving
corruptly because of marginal changes in management practice.
To provide support for a causal interpretation of our results linking management practices
to project outcomes, we later tackle three econometric challenges: (i) projects being assigned to
organizations based on their management practices; (ii) unobserved bureaucrat or organizational
characteristics that are correlated to management practices and also drive project completion
rates; (iii) management practices being endogenously determined.
The central contribution of the paper is to provide novel evidence on howmanagement practices
for bureaucrats in civil service organizations correlate to effective public sector service delivery,
and how the impacts of each dimension of management practice vary across the characteristics
of projects, organizations, and bureaucrats. Our results point to new directions for theoretical
research to better understand the contracting environment in public bureaucracies, as well as
highlighting specific areas in which the better measurement of inputs and outputs of public sector
organizations can aid our understanding of public service delivery in the developing world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews relevant aspects of the Nigerian civil
service. Section 3 details our data sources and empirical method. Section 4 presents our core
results linking public service delivery and management practices for bureaucrats. Section 5 pro-
vides evidence to help underpin a causal interpretation of our findings. Section 6 concludes by
discussing implications of our results for optimal management practices, and links our findings to
the literature on improving public services. The Appendix presents further data description and
robustness checks.
2 Institutional Background
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous country, home to 160 million individuals, double the size of
any other African country and representing 20% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa. It is a
leading setting in which to understand the determinants of public service delivery in the develop-
ing world, and also shares important characteristics with other developing countries: government
expenditures represent 26% of GDP, it has generally weak institutions holding government to ac-
count, and corrupt practices in public sector organizations are commonplace. The British colonial
government fashioned its Nigerian administration after the British Parliamentary Civil Service
System, and this is essentially what passed to the independent government of Nigeria in 1960.
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Although there have been a number of periodic reforms of the civil service, and despite the fact
that Nigeria has moved to a Presidential system of government, Nigeria’s civil service structure
still largely replicates its British colonial origins.2
2.1 Civil Service Organizations
The Nigerian civil service is organized into federal, state, and local government civil services. Our
analysis relates exclusively to federal civil service organizations. Various organizations, including
ministries, are established by statute to render specified public services.3 Table A1 lists the
63 federal civil service organizations we study. These include ministries of health, education,
environment, and water resources, and organizations that have regional bases (such as federal
polytechnics, federal medical centres, development authorities etc.). Table A1 highlights how
these organizations vary in their budget sizes, staffing levels, and decentralization. The federal
ministries are typically the largest in terms of budget, with regional organizations typically having
fewer staff and being deconcentrated from central government.4
Each civil service organization is tasked to provide various types of project. These include
construction projects: boreholes, buildings, roads and canals; as well as non-construction projects
such as procurement, training, and advocacy. Crucially for our analysis, for any given project type,
multiple organizations are observed conducting similar project activities. For example, small-scale
dams are constructed by the federal ministries of water, agriculture, and environment, and by
all of the river basin development authorities. We therefore assess how the delivery of the same
project type varies depending on the incentive structures in place for bureaucrats in the specific
organization responsible, holding constant other project and organizational characteristics.
Underlying our analysis is the notion that the objectives of civil service organizations do
not run entirely counter to raising project completion rates. Our analysis is informative on the
importance of management practices as long as organizations place some weight on this outcome.
Anecdotal evidence suggest senior management have sometimes been removed on the basis of poor
completion rates. Moreover the types of capital expenditure on projects we focus on constitutes
46% of organizational budgets in total, on average, so they undoubtedly represent an important
element of what organizations are responsible for overall.
2The constitution adopted since 1999 has many similarities with that of the United States Constitution. Legisla-
tion is enacted by a bicameral National Assembly composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Each
federal state has its own government headed by a Governor and a state parliament. Although the introduction of a
Presidential system of government in 1979 saw initial reforms to the civil service, for example under the 1988 Civil
Service Reorganization Decree No. 43, later decrees reversed some of these changes.
3The Civil Service is governed by a set of Public Service Rules and Financial Regulations, ad hoc Circular
Instructions, decrees circulated across government, and Gazette Notices (decrees published in the Government’s
gazette). Together these outline the laws regulating the business of government, and cover service appointments
and exits, discipline, salaries, management of public funds, and other major aspects of official assignments.
4Budget figures are averages for 2006-10. Staff numbers are taken from administrative data for 2010. De-
centralized organizations refer to those whose day-to-day running is largely independent of the central authority.
They have boards of governors that make decisions over policy and operation, and they have a separate budget
line to central ministries. In line with the literature, we refer to such organizations as being ‘deconcentrated’.
‘Concentrated’ organizations have a direct line of responsibility to the President and National Assembly.
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2.2 The Assignment of Civil Servants and Projects to Organizations
The Head of the Civil Service of the Federation organizes the postings and conditions of Nigeria’s
federal civil servants. Our representative survey of 4100 individual civil servants confirms this:
88% of civil servants said they had no influence over their initial posting; 60% report their current
posting being ‘at random’, with a further 22% reporting being transferred across organizations
on an impersonal basis. Hence it is unlikely that bureaucrats self-select into organizations on the
basis of the management practices in place, as evidenced in greater detail later.
Once posted, civil servants enjoy job security. Our survey reveals mean tenure at the current
organization to be almost 13 years. For senior managers (those above grade level 12) this rises to
almost 16 years. The survey also reveals that movements across organizations are rare: 67% of
bureaucrats report never having moved organization. This lack of mobility in the labor market
for bureaucrats slows down the rate at which best practices for management spread through the
bureaucracy, and might also dampen incentives for organizations to tailor management practices
in order to attract certain types of bureaucrat.
Projects are assigned to organizations centrally by the National Assembly, that enacts a budget
law specifying the projects to be implemented each fiscal year. The projects we study were all
established in law by Budget Appropriation Bills passed in 2006 or 2007. The passage of these
bills is as follows. Having received inputs from the executive branch of government, a draft
Appropriation Bill is presented to the National Assembly. The draft bill is then split into sectors
(water, health etc.) and sent to sectoral committees of the House and Senate. These committees
are delegated to hold hearings with relevant parties, to scrutinize the proposals, define budgets for
each project and decide which organization is responsible for its implementation. These committees
are staffed by politicians with qualifications or experience in the relevant sector. These sectoral
committees then recommend a budget for the sector to an Appropriation Committee which merges
the recommendations into a single budget. This unified budget is then voted on by both houses
to form that year’s Budget Appropriation Bill. This legal document defines the responsibilities of
civil service organizations in terms of projects to be delivered.
2.3 Management of Bureaucrats
It is at this point that the management of civil servants becomes crucial for the transformation
of government plans into public service delivery. To better understand how management prac-
tices evolve in organizations, we held structured interviews at four of the federal organizations in
Table A1. These revealed three common themes in how management practices are determined
in organizations: (i) the Public Service Rules of the Nigerian civil service provide guidelines on
how bureaucrats should be incentivized, and these are common to all federal organizations; (ii)
the history of senior management staff that have worked in an organization might bring their
own innovations to bear; (iii) the role of external events such as demands of trade unions. Taken
together, these interviews consistently emphasized the nature of management practices in the civil
service organizations to be slowly evolving over time, and not necessarily tailored to maximize
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public service delivery of the types of project organizations are used to being assigned.5
An econometric concern is the potential reverse causality from bureaucrat effectiveness driving
the management practices in place. While we cannot rule this out entirely given our data, we also
reiterate that such processes for how management practices were determined were not mentioned
in any of the structured interviews conducted. We address this issue in detail in Section 5.
3 Data and Empirical Method
3.1 OPEN Data on Project Completion and Quality
The Nigerian Government began a program of sweeping reforms in the major organs of govern-
ment in 2003 [Nkonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007]. As a result, the Nigerian Government
received cancellation of its external debt to the tune of US$18 billion from the Paris Club. At the
federal level, the annual savings from debt interest were channeled into the social sectors that we
study. The Presidency also saw this as an opportunity to track the effectiveness of government
expenditures, and so in 2006 and 2007 the Nigerian Government undertook the Overview of Public
Expenditure in NEEDS, known as the ‘OPEN initiative’, in which it traced, at a project level,
the use and impact of 10% of all federal Government social sector expenditures approved between
2006 and 2007. The projects selected to be part of the OPEN initiative were designed to be
representative of existing social sector expenditures, but also to be informative for those projects
that were most needed to be scaled-up nationwide.
Under the OPEN initiative, visits to public projects by expert teams identified the extent
to which they had been implemented as planned in the Federal Budget, and embodied in each
project’s technical document. The Presidency contracted national and regional teams to undertake
the monitoring process outside of the institutions of the civil service. Hence the public sector
projects were not evaluated by potentially biased civil servants, but rather by teams of independent
engineers and civil society. The engineers evaluating the projects were not those working on the
project sites and the civil society groups were recognized third sector organizations.6
5The structured interviews took place more than two years after the other surveys were fielded. In the Nigerian
public sector, management practices are said to take the Public Service Rules as their foundation. These rules
provide the framework for the running of the public service, including rules around the distribution of authority,
the nature of discipline, the provision of training, and so on. In each case, these were said to be central to
determining management practice. However, we were repeatedly told that a secondary influence on an organization’s
management practices was the history of management staff who had worked at the organization. Officials are
promoted into management positions based primarily on tenure. Views on management practices are said to be
aggregated by committee, with the chief executive marshalling, rather than defining, the direction of reform. This
situation, we were told, leads to a relatively slow changing management environment, but one that over the years
can lead to substantial divergence in management practice across organizations. Finally, external events, such as
the demands of trade unions, were said to have a third-tier influence and constrain management practices.
6The teams were recruited in a competitive tendering process that was regulated by the government’s procure-
ment agency. The decision to use monitoring teams independent of government was a function of the weakness of
existing government systems as well as the need for impartiality [Federal Government of Nigeria 2007]. Prior to the
OPEN initiative, the government had its own monitoring and evaluation systems in place (based on unannounced
visits) but these were largely perceived to be ineffective.
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We consider projects traced under the OPEN initiative that were approved in the 2006 or 2007
federal budgets. Monitoring teams visited the relevant project sites around 18 months after the
project was centrally approved. All the projects we study had twelve month completion schedules,
so that even accounting for any delay in the disbursement of funds, it is feasible for these projects
to be completed by the time of the monitoring survey.
The OPEN evaluation teams coded: (i) whether the project had started; (ii) its stage of
completion; (iii) the quality of the inputs and work. Our main outcome variable is a continuous
measure, from zero to one, of project completion rates. A recorded completion rate of zero does not
imply the organization never even attempted to work on the project. Rather, the project might
have been formulated and prepared, with responsibility for implementation having been delegated
to a department and bureaucrats within the organization. At that point however, progress on
the project halted, with funds either being returned due to lack of use, or being lost. We cannot
distinguish whether this lack of implementation reflects active or passive waste [Bandiera et al.
2009]. A completion rate of one implies the project matched its full specification.
To maximize data coverage on project quality, we are forced to utilize the most aggregate
formulation of quality reporting. A project was either of insufficient quality, satisfactory, or
commended for an ‘above average or high’ quality level. With this definition, we obtain 2235
observations of project quality, 2206 of which also have project completion data. We then define
a project quality indicator equal to one if the project is of satisfactory quality or above.
To further ensure the accuracy of monitoring reports, the Presidency put in place a system
of checks and balances. First, a centralized team of technocrats monitored the evaluation teams,
providing them with training and opportunities for standardization of their methods at national
conferences. Second, evaluators were asked to provide material, photographic, or video evidence
to support their reports. Third, the national teams and Presidency performed random checks on
evaluated sites, all of which were consistent with the findings of OPEN monitors. Evaluations of
the OPEN process indicate it successfully achieved its aims [Eboh 2010, Dijkstra et al. 2011].
The reports of OPEN evaluators describe the fate of projects budgeted for execution in the
2006 and 2007 federal budgets [Federal Government of Nigeria 2008, 2009]. We hand coded
the material from all projects recorded in OPEN initiative reports from the federal civil service
organizations listed in Table A1.7 Taken together, the coverage of projects in our sample traces
8% of all Federal Government social sector expenditures in 2006/7 budget years, corresponding to
4721 projects from 63 organizations, with an aggregate budget of around US$800 million.
We also hand coded other project level characteristics such as its budget, whether it was
a rehabilitation project, and, as described in mode detail below, its complexity as defined by
engineer-approved measures derived from the project’s technical specifications.
Table 1 provides descriptive evidence on each project type studied. Boreholes are the most
7We have a relatively broad sample of federal social sector organizations. In the water and power sectors, we
cover all the relevant federal organizations. In the health sector, we cover 28% of health organizations, with the
excluded a subset of the medical service providers such as a number of Federal Medical Centres. Similarly, in
education we cover 14% of education organizations, excluding a range of institutions of learning such as some
Federal Colleges of Education.
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common type, corresponding to 29% of all OPEN projects. Key to our empirical method is
that most project types are implemented by a range of organizations: for example there are 18
civil service organizations that construct boreholes, as shown in Column 2. Hence we are later
able to study the impact of management practices for bureaucrats, that vary across civil service
organizations, on project implementation, conditional on project-type fixed effects.
Column 3 highlights the scale of projects by project type: most constitute the ‘nuts-and-bolts’
of rural infrastructure development: the median budget for dams is US$18,000, and the median
budget for a building is US$120,000. It is because projects are relatively small scale that partly
explains why multiple organizations are observed being tasked to implement similar project types.
Columns 4 to 7 show completion rates by project type. Aggregating across all project types, 38%
of projects are never started. Although this might emphasize the role that corruption or passive
waste might play, it is not a complete explanation for bureaucrat behavior: 31% of projects are fully
completed, and conditional on being started, the average project completion rate is .75. Examining
the data by project type emphasizes the variation of completion rates across and within project
types. Conditional on being started, most projects are more than 50% complete. The final column
provides information on the percentage of projects rated to be of satisfactory quality by the team
of independent engineers and civil society: here we tend to observe the majority of projects being
ranked highly irrespective of project type.
Table 2 presents descriptive evidence on the public service delivery of the ten largest civil service
organizations in our sample, as defined by the total number of projects implemented (although
this maps closely to the size of organizations as measured by total budget). This again emphasizes
that, with the exception of the Federal Ministry of Power and Steel, each organization is engaged
in providing multiple project types. We observe huge variation across these large organizations
in the percentage of projects that are never started (11% to 95%), and that are fully completed
(3% to 89%). The final column provides information on the percentage of projects rated to be of
satisfactory quality: here we observe far greater variation across civil service organizations (25%
to 100%) than we previously documented in Table 1 across project types.
These statistics suggest there might be important factors at the organization level that drive
this variation in the quantity and quality of public sector projects. We next detail how we measure
one such factor: the management practices civil service bureaucrats operate under.8
3.2 Measuring Management Practices
There has been a revival of research investigating the impacts of management practices on the
performance of private sector firms [Ichniowski et al. 1997, Black and Lynch 2001, Bloom and Van
Reenen 2007, 2010; Bloom et al. 2012, 2013]. We follow Bloom and Van Reenen’s (henceforth
BVR) approach to measuring management practices in organizations. We adapt their survey tool
and practices to the Nigerian public sector setting, taking into account long-standing views on
8Regressing project completion rates on organizational fixed effects yields an R2 of .33, suggesting that orga-
nizational characteristics such as management practices can plausibly play an important role in determining such
outcomes.
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the importance of autonomy in public administration [Simon 1983, Rose-Ackerman 1986, Wilson
1989] as well as recent insights from the ‘new performance management’ and ‘good governance
agenda’ perspectives [Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008, Goldfinch et al. 2012].
To obtain reliable information on management practices, we worked closely with members of
the OPEN office in the Presidency, as well as members of the Office of the Head of the Civil Service
of the Federation in undertaking the questionnaire development process. A number of pilots using
semi-structured interviews like those in BVR were held to outline key similarities and deviations
from the BVR methodology. After a number of months of collaborative questionnaire design, civil
servants from each organization practised the survey with each other and identified where wording
or phrasing was not suitable for the Nigerian context.
The management survey enumerators were trained together for a number of weeks including
practice interview sessions before undertaking the first few interviews together. The aim was to
ensure a consistent interview engagement across sessions. To obtain information on management
practices, senior management staff from the key departments of the organization, but not the chief
executive officer, were brought together in a private office to discuss managerial practice at the
organization in confidence. While each manager filled in their own questionnaire, the enumera-
tor looked for a consensus and recorded that in her own questionnaire. This is the underlying
information we use to construct management practice indices for each organization.9
From September to November 2010, our survey team held interviews at the organizations
listed in Table A1. Following BVR, interviews were ‘double blind’ in that: (i) managers were
not told in advance they were being scored or shown a score grid; (ii) enumerators were given no
information on the performance of the organization. However, the delay between the collection of
the OPEN data set in 2006/7 and the Civil Servants Survey in 2010 raises the question whether
civil service structures changed significantly in between data collection periods. For example,
those organizations found to have low completion rates might have instigated reforms to improve
management practices for bureaucrats. However, there is little evidence from other sources of any
major civil service reforms being implemented over this period, or of significant changes in the
political organization of federal agencies [Alabi and Fashagba 2010, Ogundiya 2011]. In addition,
we find little evidence of a spike in turnover of bureaucrats around 2007, coinciding with the
Presidential election: 80% of bureaucrats employed in 2010 were at the same organization in 2007.
The BVR evaluation tool elicits management practices through a semi-structured interview
covering four topics: operations, targets, incentives and monitoring. We apply the BVR approach
in the context of public bureaucracies, extending the series of practices elicited to cover those
more relevant for managing bureaucrats. As a result, our management survey covers nine topics:
9In this context, conducting management surveys via telephone was judged to be far less likely to reveal true
practices than conducting face-to-face group interviews. Second, given the interview format, individual manager
responses on management practices are available, but we cannot link individual managers to specific projects and so
do not utilize that information (each project is delivered by teams of bureaucrats across sub-departments): rather
we use the consensus measure recorded by the enumerator. Managers were told their individual responses would
remain confidential. Third, we checked whether recorded practices are sensitive to the number of managers present
at interview (that does vary across organizations): we find no such relationship. Fourth, the mean interview time
was 74 minutes, and we include this as part of our noise controls in the empirical analysis.
12
roles, flexibility, incentives, monitoring, culture, targeting, facilities, skills and staffing. We then
replicate the BVR method eliciting information on each of these broad topic areas from our civil
service organizations, although we do so using a more limited set of underlying questions related
to each topic, and some of our questions permit only yes/no replies, while others are based on a
full scoring grid. Table A2 details the questions that come under each of the nine topic areas,
and how they are aggregated into what we refer to as ‘autonomy’, ‘incentives’ and ‘other practice’
indices (denoted CS-autonomy, CS-incentives and CS-other respectively).10
The questions on ‘roles’ assess the extent to which bureaucrats can input into policy formu-
lation and implementation processes. The questions on ‘flexibility’ aim to measure whether a
bureaucratic agency is able to re-organize its bureaucrats and adapt tasks to respond to best
practice and project peculiarities. We combine answers to the roles and flexibility practices to
construct an index of management practices capturing bureaucrats’ ‘autonomy’ (CS-autonomy).
The questions on ‘incentives’ are designed to capture more familiar notions of incentive provi-
sion for bureaucrats, both positively in terms of whether rewards are given for some dimensions of
service, and negatively in terms of punishments for poor service; the questions on ‘monitoring’ cap-
ture practices related to the collection and use of performance indicators. We combine the answers
to the incentives and monitoring practices to construct an overall index of management practices
capturing the performance related ‘incentives’ bureaucrats operate under (CS-incentives).
The remaining topics cover the following practices: the ‘facilities’ questions relate to how well-
functioning the organization is, for example, by collecting information on the availability of elec-
tricity and internet facilities to bureaucrats; the ‘skills’ questions relate to the human capital of
bureaucrats, especially their IT competencies, and the trainings offered to them; the ‘staffing’
questions focus staff recruitment and retention, as well as how workloads are spread across bu-
reaucrats; the ‘targeting’ questions relate to the existence and clarity of targets for bureaucrats,
and finally, the questions related to ‘culture’ try to elicit information on how colleagues are col-
lectively treated and interact with others outside of the workplace. We combine the answers on
all these topics to construct a third index of ‘other’ management practices (CS-other).
We clearly recognize there is no definitive way to solicit management practices along these
various dimensions, nor a definitive way to collate them into more aggregate indices. Our ap-
proach is primarily designed to reflect two broad areas of management practice emphasized in the
public administration and economics literatures as being first order determinants of bureaucrats’
behavior: autonomy and performance incentives. However we later consider two extreme cases
by documenting the correlation between project completion rates and: (i) a fully disaggregated
10Hence there are two important deviations from how we elicit management practices using the BVR method.
First, we tailored the precise wording of some questions to better fit our context. Second, we did not use the same
universe of questions from the BVR survey. In most cases this was because we could not identify an analogous
concept in the public sector that was relevant or not covered by other questions. For example, the majority of
questions on lean manufacturing in BVR (e.g. ‘What kinds of lean (modern) manufacturing processes have you
introduced?’) were not utilized. However, those on improving manufacturing processes (‘How do you go about
improving the manufacturing process itself?’) were translated into the redefinition of procedures in response to
new needs or challenges (‘Does your organization make efforts to redefine its standard procedures in response to
the specific needs and peculiarities of a community?’).
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specification showing the separate impact of all nine dimensions of management practice; (ii) an
aggregate measure of management practice that collates all nine categories into a single index.11
Given these indices measure broad practices, rather than reflecting specific compensation schemes
or workplace policies, there might be less concern that such broad practices can rapidly endoge-
nously respond to either past project completion rates, or to changing bureaucrat characteristics.
The responses to each practice in Table A2 are converted into normalized z-scores (so are
continuous variables with mean zero and variance one by construction), where in all cases, variables
are increasing in the commonly understood notion of ‘better management’. For the CS-autonomy
index, we assume greater autonomy corresponds to better management practices (our empirical
analysis then assesses whether this is positively or negatively correlated to project completion
rates). For our core analysis, we aggregate z-scores into the three CS- measures by taking the
unweighted mean of the underlying z-scores. We later show the robustness of our results to other
weighting schemes.
Two further points are of note. First, the CS-autonomy and CS-incentive management scores
are positively correlated. Hence in the cross section of federal organizations, the provision of
autonomy and performance incentives do not appear to be substitutes. Second, these correlations
are not high: the CS-based measures have a correlation coefficient of .24. Combined with the
underlying variation in each measure across organizations, this opens up the possibility to precisely
identify the separate relationship of each measure to public service delivery.12 The marginal
impacts of these two measures can also be separately identified from that of the CS-other index:
the CS-autonomy (CS-incentives) index has a correlation of .17 (.43) with the CS-other measure.
These indices, and the underlying management questions, provide us with our core explanatory
variation. Following BVR, we also collected data on the interviewees for each survey, interview
characteristics and the quality of the survey session. These ‘noise controls’ will also be conditioned
on in our baseline empirical specifications as described later.
3.3 Project Complexity and Other Variables
When relating project outcomes to management practices for bureaucrats, it is important to
condition on project complexity. To measure this we collaborated with a pair of Nigerian engineers
familiar with the OPEN initiative and a group of international scholars with research interests in
project complexity. The complexity indicators were based on the detailed technical specifications
specified for each project, and are constructed following engineering best practice that emphasizes
multiple dimensions of complexity [Remington and Pollack 2007]. The Appendix: (i) details the
construction of these indices, and presents descriptive statistics for them; (ii) describes checks we
put in place, using multiple engineers, to establish the validity of these complexity measures.
11We have also used principle components analysis to assess the importance of individual practices through factor
analysis. For the matrix of all nine sub-indices, we find the first factor explains 28% of the variation.
12Such substitution might have been observed if bureaucrats have strong career concerns, and so performance
incentives are not required once autonomy is given to individuals. Alternatively, if bureaucrats are intrinsically
motivated they might need only to be provided autonomy, and indeed, the provision of explicit incentives might
crowd out their intrinsic motivation.
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These complexity indicators reflect the number of inputs and methods needed for the project,
the ease with which the relevant labor and capital inputs can be obtained, ambiguities in design
and project implementation, and the overall difficulty in managing the project. Some of these
features relate to the hallmark differences in goods supplied between public and private sectors.
Our empirical approach then aims to hold constant the complexity of the project along these
dimensions, including issues related to organizations needing to sub-contract project implementa-
tion to a private sector firm, for example. This allows us to focus in on the correlation between
managerial practices for bureaucrats and project completion rates, all else equal.13
The other project level controls include the project’s budget and whether it was a rehabilita-
tion project. Finally, organizational variables we control for include administrative data on the
number of employees at each organization, the proportion of staff with graduate/postgraduate
qualifications, and the organization’s total budget. In some specifications we also condition on
controls for the state in which a given project is located. We construct these state controls using
aggregated data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics.
3.4 Empirical Method
Our baseline empirical specification has as its unit of observation project i of type j in organization
n. The project types are listed in Table 1, and the federal civil service organizations from which
management practices have been elicited are listed in Table A1. We estimate the following OLS
specification, where yijn corresponds to the project completion rate, or the assessment of project
quality, as described in Table 1, and the three main indices of management practice are the CS-
autonomy, CS-incentives and CS-other indicators described above,
yijn = γ1CS-autonomyn+ γ2CS-incentivesn+ γ3CS-othern+ β1PCijn+ β2OCn+ λj + ǫijn, (1)
PCijn includes project characteristics such as the project complexity, log project budget and
whether the project is a rehabilitation or not. OCn includes organization level controls such as
the log number of staff, log total organization budget, log capital budget, and the proportions of
officials with a college and postgraduate degree. Following BVR, within OCn we also condition
on ‘noise’ controls related to the management surveys. These include four interviewer dummies,
indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week
the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable
indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview,
and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer, which is a simply
a subjective assessment as to whether the interview went well.
As typically many organizations are observed implementing the same project type j, we control
13Our civil servant survey also helps to shed some light on the relationship between bureaucratic organizations
and such third party contractors/suppliers/consultants. For example, only 6% of civil servants agreed with the
statement that, the most successful contractors “are aligned with the government in some way”; only 13% of civil
servants reported having been offered a ‘small present’, ‘money’, or an ‘expensive present’ by such contractors.
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for project fixed effects λj in our baseline specification (1). Our parameters of interest are γ1 and
γ2: as each CS- measure is a standardized z-score, these coefficients measure the effect size of a
one standard deviation change in management practices along the respective margins of autonomy
and performance incentives. As our main specification controls for project fixed effects, we allow
the standard errors to be clustered by project type-organization. In the Appendix we demonstrate
the robustness of our results to allowing standard errors to be clustered by organization (across all
its project types). Our working sample is based on 4721 projects from 63 organizations on which
we have data on management practices and project, organization and bureaucrat characteristics.
In specification (1) we are implicitly assuming that, within project type and controlling for
project and organizational characteristics, the underlying production function is the same across
projects. Specification (1) then corresponds to a reduced form representation of an underlying
production function in which management practices convert the raw total of available bureaucratic
labor into effective labor inputs in the completion of public projects.
To provide support for a causal interpretation of the estimated partial correlations linking
management practices to project outcomes (γ̂1, γ̂2), we need to tackle three econometric challenges:
(i) projects are non-randomly assigned to organizations based on their management practices;
(ii) unobserved bureaucrat or organizational characteristics that are correlated to management
practices and also drive project completion rates; (iii) management practices being endogenously
determined by bureaucrat characteristics or project outcomes. In the next section we present our
OLS results on the partial correlations between various dimensions of management practice and
project completion rates. Section 5 then provides evidence to address these econometric concerns.
4 Core Results
4.1 Project Completion Rates
Table 3 presents our main results on how civil service management practices correlate with project
completion rates. Column 1 only controls for the three CS- measures. We find that higher levels
of autonomy for bureaucrats correlate to significantly higher completion rates (γ̂1 > 0). The
impact of greater use of performance incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats on project completion
is however negative and also significantly different from zero (γ̂2 < 0). Columns 2 to 4 sequentially
condition on noise controls and organizational characteristics, project characteristics, and project
fixed effects. Throughout, we find both management practices have significant impacts on project
completion rates at the 1% significance level.14
Our preferred specification is in Column 4 with project fixed effects. This shows that a one
standard deviation increase in CS-autonomy corresponds to significantly higher project completion
14Among the noise controls, neither the age, gender, or tenure of interviewees significantly impact project com-
pletion rates. Nor do whether the interviews were undertaken in the morning, their length, or the quality rating
of the interview. Noise controls that are significant include whether the interviews where undertaken on a Tuesday
or Saturday (negative), or during Ramadan (positive). A few of the interviewer dummies are significant. The
exclusion of the noise controls does not change the qualitative nature of the main results reported.
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rates of 18%. A one standard deviation increase in CS-incentives corresponds to significantly lower
project completion rates of 14%. The stability of both coefficients of interest and their standard
errors across Columns helps ameliorate the concern that there likely remain other omitted controls
that would cause large changes in magnitude and significance of the coefficients of interest.
The estimated coefficient on the other dimension management practice of CS-other, γ̂3, is less
stable in magnitude and significance across specifications. This might be as expected given that it is
composed of the widest range of underlying components. In all specifications, better management
practices on this CS-other dimension are positively correlated with project completion rates; in
Column 4 the estimated coefficient is indeed significant at conventional levels, although the effect
size is significantly smaller than for the two dimensions of management practice.
In Appendix Table A4 we show the robustness of these core findings to assuming the distur-
bance terms ǫijn in (1) are clustered by organization (across all project types), correcting p-values
for potential biases due to a small number of clusters [Cameron et al. 2008]. In Figure A2 and
Appendix Table A5 we probe the robustness of our baseline result along eight margins: (i) defining
threshold completion rates that deem the project usable and seeing how management practices
relate to reaching these thresholds (especially those related to completion rates of zero and one);
(ii) restricting the sample to the largest/smallest organizations; (iii) removing organizations at the
tails of the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives measures; (iv) considering the impacts of managerial
practices on construction and non-construction projects separately; (v) considering the impacts
of managerial practices on projects implemented by centralized and decentralized organizations
separately; (vi) controlling for characteristics of the state in which the project are located, and
exploring how the results vary depending on whether projects are located in the North or South
of the country that defines the principal cultural divide in Nigeria; (vii) alternative constructions
of the CS- management practice indices (rather than the equal weighting procedure); (viii) using
a fractional regression model rather than OLS.
One concern is that project completion rates may not be a useful outcome indicator: projects
may be almost completed but to a low quality standard. We therefore construct a ‘quality-adjusted’
completion rate where the proportion completed is multiplied by a binary quality indicator. Where
quality is unsatisfactory, whatever the level of completion, this variable is set to zero. As described
in Section 3, the drawback of using this outcome measure is that information on project quality is
only available for around half the projects for which we have project completion data, originating
in 51 civil service organizations. To ease comparison of the samples used, we note that if we
re-estimate our main specification with the project completion rate as the dependent variable, but
for the sample in which quality data is available, the partial correlations of each CS- measure with
project completion rates are not much different to our baseline specification in Column 4.
Column 5 then shows the relationship between management practices and quality-adjusted
project completion rates. We find the CS- measures to quantitatively impact quality-adjusted
project completion rates in a similar way to project completion rates: higher levels of CS-autonomy
are associated with significantly higher quality projects, and higher levels of CS-incentive are
associated with significantly lower quality projects.
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4.2 Exploring the Negative Impact of Performance Incentives
Our results confirm that the two dimensions of management practice we focus on: autonomy and
performance incentives/monitoring, do indeed correlate to the quantity and quality of public ser-
vices delivered, as emphasized by the public administration and economics literatures respectively.
The overall positive correlation of CS-autonomy with project completion rates provides support to
the notion that public agencies ought to delegate some decision making to bureaucrats, relying on
their professionalism and resolve to deliver public services [Simon 1983]. On average, the evidence
is less supportive of the notion that when bureaucrats have more agency or organizations are more
flexibly structured, then they are more likely to pursue their own, potentially corrupt, objectives
that diverge from societal interests, resulting in fewer public services being delivered.
The robust negative correlation we document between project completion rates and manage-
ment practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureaucrats, is far more
surprising and counter to a large body of evidence from private sector settings. As described in
the introduction, the evidence on the impacts of performance-related incentives in public sector
settings is mixed (often focusing on the impacts of specific compensation schemes to frontline
workers).15 Ours is among the first evidence to suggest the possibility that such management
practices, broadly defined, have negative impacts on the vital tier of civil service bureaucrats.
The interpretation of the negative partial correlation is nuanced because we measure man-
agement practices related to the provision of incentives and monitoring: we do not necessarily
measure the use of explicit compensation schemes based on project completion. As such, the
detrimental impacts of such practices for bureaucrats can be interpreted in at least two ways.
First, bureaucrats might operate in a classic multi-tasking environment, exerting some types of
effort that can be labelled as ‘processing’ efforts, that do not lead to project completion rates, and
also exerting other more productive types of effort that raise completion rates. Our management
practice measure might then capture an incentive system that places excessive regulatory burden
or ‘red tape’ on bureaucrats (say through the use of mis-targeted key performance indicators),
that has long been argued to lead bureaucrats to mis-allocate effort towards processing activities
[Kelman 1990]. Alternatively, our management practices related to performance incentives and
monitoring might well pick up subjective performance evaluation (SPE), rather than explicit in-
centives based on signals of effort/output. While SPE has the benefit of being based on a more
rounded set of assessments, such subjective assessments also give rise to other biases and dys-
functional responses, especially the desire of agents to engage in influencing activities to curry
favor with supervisors [Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1988]. If so, the increased use of such
mis-targeted incentives and key performance indicators can also lead to bureaucrats reallocating
15In health, two recent Cochrane reviews have come to different conclusions on the efficacy of pay for performance
[Flodgren et al. 2011, Scott et al. 2011]. Perry et al. [2009] review 57 studies on pay for performance in the public
sector and conclude ‘pay-for-performance continues to be adopted but persistently fails to deliver’. Hasnain et
al. [2012] review over 60 public sector studies, and find the vast majority are for tasks where outputs are more
easily measurable such as teachers, health workers, and revenue inspectors. They argue there is simply insufficient
evidence of the impact of incentives on bureaucrats.
18
effort towards non-productive tasks, thus reducing project completion rates overall.16
To begin to shed light on these possible interpretations, Column 6 of Table 3 interacts the two
CS- measures of management practices for autonomy and performance incentives. We find evidence
of an interplay between the two: the negative impacts of performance related pay on project
completion rates are offset when bureaucrats are provided more autonomy and organizations are
more flexible. This might be indicative of the fact that with such autonomy and flexibility,
bureaucrats can, on the margin, more easily work around any poorly targeted elements of the
incentive/monitoring environment they face that might otherwise lead to dysfunctional responses
such as them exerting processing efforts or engaging in influence activities.17
To probe this further we now investigate how characteristics of projects, organizations and
bureaucrats interplay with management practices. By doing so we aim to shed light on the extent
to which our measured management practices might capture that multi-tasking concerns are first
order for bureaucrats, or that they are subject to SPE and so might engage in influence activities.
4.2.1 Project and Organizational Characteristics
We first establish whether the impact of management practices related to performance incentives
vary with the complexity of projects, assuming that more complex projects require more varied
effort types to be exerted. If so, performance incentives/monitoring might be especially hard to
design for such projects. Column 1 in Table 4 takes this prediction to the data by interacting the
CS-incentives measure with the continuous measure of project complexity. For expositional ease,
this interaction term is defined in terms of its deviation from mean, so the coefficients on CS-
autonomy and CS-incentives are interpreted as the marginal effect of these practices, evaluated at
the mean of project complexity. We see the negative impacts of CS-incentives related practices for
bureaucrats are exacerbated in more complex projects, in line with a multi-tasking interpretation.
To probe further the idea that it is difficult to target incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats
towards those efforts that aid project completion, we examine how the impacts of this management
practice vary across projects conducted by the organization. More precisely, for each organization
we define the modal project type assigned to it. We then create a dummy equal to zero if project
i is of this modal type and equal to one if it corresponds to a more atypical project that the
organization is tasked to complete. Column 2 shows the impact of performance incentives to
indeed be even more negative among non-modal project types (the magnitude of the impact being
around 40% of that on modal project-types). This suggests management practices related to
performance are better tailored to the modal project type each organization is engaged in.
16Baker [2002] develops a multi-tasking model to characterize how distortion and risk affect the value and use
of performance measures. The model highlights how in public bureaucracies, that cannot use stock incentives and
have nebulous objective functions, this leads to a fundamental difficulty in defining ‘good’ performance measures.
Hence the potential for dysfunctional responses when high powered incentives are utilized in such settings.
17Hence there are gains to organizations from coupling together good management practices along these two
dimensions. Indeed as discussed in Section 3.2, we do observe the two CS- measures in the cross section of
organizations having a correlation coefficient of .24, so better management practices along both dimensions are
weakly bundled together in most cases.
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Our third approach to shed light on whether incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats might be
poorly targeted exploits information on the inherent riskiness/ambiguity of projects as encom-
passed in their technical specifications. Again we might think of project types with more inherent
design ambiguity to be those for which incentives and monitoring are hardest to accurately target.
To explore this, we consider projects of different types j to be of systematically different levels
of ambiguity, and then proceed in two steps. First, we measure this design ambiguity using sub-
components of the complexity indictor described in Table A3. In particular we construct a z-score
based on the design uncertainty, implementation uncertainty, design ambiguity and implementa-
tion ambiguity components of the project complexity metric. We then take the average of this
over all projects of type j, denoting the average ambiguity of projects of type j by σj.
Second, we estimate a specification analogous to (1) for a given project type j, obviously ex-
cluding project fixed effects. In our sample, there are sufficient numbers of projects implemented
by enough organizations to estimate this for five project types: boreholes, buildings, dams, procure-
ment and training. For each project type j we then obtain an estimate of the partial correlation
between CS-incentives and project completion rates, γ̂2j, conditional on CS-autonomy. Figure 1
then plots the five (γ̂2j , σj) pairs, as well as a cubic best fit.
The evidence suggests a negative relationship across project types between inherent design
ambiguities, as assessed by engineering best practice, and the marginal impact of management
practices related to incentives and monitoring on project completion rates.18 In short, projects
with the greatest ambiguities in design and implementation, might be those for which incen-
tives/monitoring schemes are hardest to design well, and so illicit the most dysfunctional responses
from bureaucrats. The heterogenous impacts documented across project types in Figure 1 might
also shed light on why the existing literature documents such mixed findings for the impacts of
incentive provision in public sector settings. Our findings highlight such impacts might well vary
with the nature of tasks/projects, such as their complexity and design ambiguity. Finally, we note
that the average ambiguity of project types σj correlates with the proportions of those projects
that have completion rates of zero. This mitigates against the idea that corrupt practices are
entirely the reason behind low project completion rates. Rather, bureaucrats might simply shy
away from implementing the most ambiguously designed projects.
Our fourth approach to understanding whether incentive/monitoring schemes might be poorly
designed in this setting uses the intuition that if the negative impacts of performance incentives
reflect the inability of organizations to correctly target such incentives to the relevant types of
bureaucrat effort, this problem might be ameliorated in organizations with better IT facilities,
who presumably have better capability to objectively measure effort types. To explore this we
interact our CS-incentives measure with the practices captured in CS-facilities: as Table A2 shows,
this relates to the availability of computing facilities at the organization. In this specification we
redefine CS-other to exclude the CS-facilities component. The result in Column 3 of Table 4 indeed
18Given the CS-performance and CS-autonomy are positively correlated and have opposite signed impacts on
project completion rates, this negative relationship between risk and incentives would be attenuated if we do not
control for CS-autonomy when estimating γ̂
2j [Prendergast 2002].
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shows the impacts of CS-incentives to be significantly less negative in organizations with better IT
facilities. Moreover, there is no significant levels impact of CS-facilities — the provision/accessibility
of IT facilities for bureaucrats only seem to matter in combination with management practices
related to performance incentives/monitoring.
4.2.2 Bureaucrat Characteristics
The remaining specifications consider how the impact of management practices related to per-
formance incentives vary with three bureaucrat characteristics: their tenure, intrinsic motivation
and perceptions of organizational corruption. To measure civil servant characteristics along each
dimension we use the survey we administered to a representative sample of officials at each or-
ganization. We interviewed 4148 civil servants from the 63 federal organizations studied here,
corresponding to around 13% of their total workforce.
As described in Section 2, Nigerian bureaucrats enjoy long tenure. Tenure can interplay with
the effectiveness of management practices. On the one hand, longer serving bureaucrats might
learn over time how best to respond to incentives by exploiting other flexibilities. On the other
hand, if bureaucrats are subject to SPE they might learn how best to engage in influence activities.
To check for this, Column 4 in Table 4 controls for an interaction between the average tenure of
bureaucrats in the organization (in deviation from mean) with the CS-incentives measure, as well
as the direct impact of tenure. We find the negative impacts of performance-based incentives are
even worse in organizations staffed by more experienced bureaucrats, as might be consistent with
bureaucrats learning to engage in influencing activities. We also note there is no direct levels effect
of tenure on project completion rates, so that it is not the case that bureaucrats naturally reduce
effort over time as they become embedded within long-standing norms of poor standards in civil
service organizations. Rather, there appears to be a specific interplay between bureaucrat tenure
and the use of performance incentives/monitoring for bureaucrats.
A burgeoning literature suggests those attracted to public service might be relatively more
intrinsically motivated than those working in the private sector. Performance incentives might
then be detrimental if they crowd out such intrinsic motivation [Rose-Ackerman 1986, Perry
and Wise 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Francois and Vlassopoulos 2008]. To measure civil
servant’s intrinsic motivation, we asked bureaucrats which factor that had most influenced them
to originally enter the civil service from the following options: ‘I was interested in the type of
work’, ‘income prospects’, ‘the prestige associated with such a job’, ‘the stable career path that a
job in the service affords’, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’, ‘it was the only employment I could get’,
‘educational opportunities’, ‘other’. We define those that answered, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’
as being intrinsically motivated. Roughly a third of officials state that they entered the civil service
to serve Nigeria (with the percentage being slightly higher among less senior bureaucrats).19 For
19In the public administration literature, public service motivation is usually measured using the scale developed
in Perry [1996], based on statements related to politics, public service and pro-social activities. This is the approach
also followed in Dal Bo et al. [2013]. Alternative approaches employed in the economics literature include: (i)
dictator games to examine how many resources an individual transfers to a pro-social task [Ashraf et al. 2012];
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each organization, we then construct the fraction of intrinsically motivated bureaucrats.
Column 5 then shows how the impacts of CS-incentives varies by the intrinsic motivation
of bureaucrats in the organization. The previously documented negative impact of providing
performance incentives to bureaucrats, is significantly offset when a greater share of bureaucrats are
themselves intrinsically motivated. This suggests that although on average providing performance
incentives to bureaucrats has negative impacts on public service delivery, this is less the case
when such incentives are provided to intrinsically motivated bureaucrats. Indeed, our evidence
suggests incentives/monitoring crowd-in the effort of intrinsically motivated bureaucrats. If our
CS-incentives measure captures SPE being in place for bureaucrats, the result highlights that
intrinsically motivated bureaucrats exert more productive efforts in organizations where such SPE
are utilized to a greater extent, rather than engaging in influence activities, say.20
While the recent economics literature has emphasized the importance of the intrinsic moti-
vation of bureaucrats, a long-standing literature in public administration emphasizes that civil
servants might pursue their own self-interest or be disinclined to exert effort [Wilson 1989]. This
more negative view of bureaucrats spurs our final set of results, that explore how the impacts of
incentives/monitoring are mediated through perceptions of corruption among civil service organi-
zations. Corruption in public bureaucracies is a first order issue in Nigeria, and in many countries
at similar stages of development (although the fact that 31% of projects are completed fully also
suggests corruption is not all pervasive).
To elicit information on perceptions of corruption, we began by discussing vignettes with
bureaucrats, then made those scenarios closer to the bureaucrat’s actual situation, and finally
asked individuals about their own observations and experiences of corruption. We asked on what
proportion of recent projects the official had worked on, did they observe ‘others breaking service
rules for their own benefit’. On average, officials stated that on 38% of projects such observations
of corrupt practice had been made, that, by chance, coincides with the proportion of projects with
a zero completion rate. We aggregate this to the organization level to construct the proportion of
projects bureaucrats report having observed corrupt practices on.21
Column 6 shows how the impacts of our CS-incentives measure varies by perceptions of cor-
ruption among bureaucrats. To begin with we note the robustly negative levels impacts of our
corruption measure on project completion rates. This affirms that our measure is indeed capturing
some element of civil servant behavior that is deleterious for public service delivery. However, we
see that the negative impacts of performance-based incentives do not vary with perceptions of
(ii) charitable contributions [Buurman et al. 2012]. In our civil servant survey, ‘the chance to serve Nigeria’ was
the modal answer given. The other two most frequent reasons were ‘I was interested in the type of work’ and ‘the
stable career path that a job in the service affords’, that were each given by around 20% of individuals
20Ashraf et al. [2012] present evidence from a field experiment in Zambia for workers hired to engage in a pro-
social task that also documents how performance incentives crowd-in the effort of intrinsically motivated workers.
21We also asked whether officials had themselves been put under pressure to: (i) change the project location;
(ii) change project specifications; (iii) help select particular contractors/suppliers/consultants; (iv) divert some of
the funds. Aggregating responses into an organizational average, officials stated that they had experienced such
pressures on 19% of projects. We prefer to use the measure related to observed corrupt practices over this measure
because officials are obviously cautious when potentially incriminating themselves.
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corruption among bureaucrats. In short, the evidence suggests that corruption has a direct and
quantitatively large negative impact on project completion rates, but that marginal changes in
management practices have no impact on such behaviors.22
Finally, we note that we have also explored the heterogeneous impacts of management practices
related to autonomy. However, we place less attention on these findings because economic theory
is less developed to guide such an empirical analysis. For completeness we note the impacts
of management practices related to autonomy appear to be generally more homogeneous than
the impacts of incentives/monitoring: they do not significantly vary with project complexity,
non-modal project types, bureaucratic tenure, or the prevalence of reported corrupt behavior by
bureaucrats. This last result again emphasizes that corrupt practices are unlikely to be affected
by marginal changes in management practice. We do however find that the positive impacts
on project completion rates of practices related to autonomy are significantly stronger when a
greater proportion of bureaucrats report being intrinsically motivated: providing more autonomy
and flexibility to bureaucrats might be especially beneficial when bureaucrats are socially minded.
We leave for future research the exploration of such heterogeneous impacts.
5 Econometric Concerns
To view the estimated partial correlations on our CS- measures as being informative of causal
impacts, we need to tackle three econometric challenges broadly related to the following issues:
(i) projects being non-randomly assigned to organizations based on their management practices;
(ii) unobserved bureaucrat or organizational characteristics that are correlated to management
practices and also drive project completion rates; (iii) management practices being endogenously
determined by bureaucrat characteristics or project outcomes.
5.1 Project Assignment
The first class of concerns relate to the assignment of projects to organizations on the basis of
management practices in place. For example, if better managed organizations are more likely to
be assigned harder-to-implement projects, this creates a spurious negative correlation between our
CS- measures and project completion rates. This suggests (γ̂1, γ̂2) are both biased in the same
direction, and hence we note that a more complicated explanation is required to imply that γ̂1 is
both upwards biased and γ̂2 is downwards biased. This issue notwithstanding, we address concerns
about the non-random assignment of projects in two ways.
We first use a conditional logit model to estimate the factors determining the assignment of
22We have explored whether there exists within-sample values of the interacted variables in Table 4 at which
the marginal impact of CS-performance becomes positive. Generally, this is not the case: even for the least
complex projects or the most IT advanced organizations the marginal impact of management practices related
to incentives/monitoring is negative. The one exception is bureaucratic tenure: in 8% of organizations average
bureaucratic tenure is less than 7 years, and the coefficients from Column 4 then imply that the total marginal
impact of CS-performance on project completion rates is positive.
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project i to organization n, including the management practices in place in organization n. As
described in the Appendix and Table A6, we find no robust evidence of a correlation between the
assignment of projects to an organization and any of the three CS- measures. Our second approach
conducts further analysis at the organization level, estimating the following specification,
wn = θ1CS-autonomyn + θ2CS-incentivesn + θ3CS-othern + πXn + ǫn, (2)
where observations are for the 63 organizations listed in Table A1, wn are measures related to
the set of projects assigned to organization n by Parliament, the CS- measures are as previously
described, and Xn includes the same organization level controls and noise controls as previously
described. Robust standard errors are reported.
The results are presented in Table A7 and show that: (i) θ̂1and θ̂2 are both positive, so that
better managed organizations in dimensions related to autonomy and performance incentives are
assigned more projects, but neither correlation is significantly different from zero (Columns 1);
(ii) the unique number of project types assigned to an organization is also not significantly related
to the management practices in place (Column 2). Taken together, the results in Tables A6
and A7 suggest that whatever the bargaining game between various stakeholders in the lengthy
Parliamentary procedure that assigns projects to civil service organizations, there is not much
evidence to suggest it is based on management practices in those organizations.
5.2 Unobservables
The second class of econometric concern is that our measures of management practice are cor-
related to unobserved factors captured in ǫijn in (1), and these unobservables directly determine
project completion rates thus biasing our coefficients of interest. To develop some intuition on the
direction of bias, we consider the simplest case where we only condition on the constant term and
the two CS- measures of interest in (1). It is then straightforward to show that the parameters of
interest are functions of the variances of the two management practices, denoted σ2CS-a and σ
2
CS-i,
their covariance with each other (σCS-a,CS−i) and with the outcome (σCS-a,y, σCS-i,y):
γ̂1 =
σCS-a,y.σ
2
CS-i − σCS-i,yσCS-a,CS−i
σ2CS-a.σ
2
CS-i − [σCS-a,CS−i]
2
. (3)
γ̂2 can be analogously defined. Given both CS- measures are standardized z-scores and their
covariance is .24, the denominator in (3) is .9424. Substituting in for y in σCS-a,y and σCS-i,y in
the numerator in (3), the bias depends on the following term:
γ̂1 − γ1 = cov(CS-a, ǫ)− σCS-a,CS−icov(CS-i, ǫ). (4)
To fix ideas we assume the unobserved factor is positively correlated with management practices.
In this case the impact of CS-autonomy management practices on project completion rates is
actually underestimated (so γ̂1 ≤ γ1), and so in truth, even more positive than our baseline findings
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suggest, if cov(CS-a,ǫ)
cov(CS-i,ǫ)
≤ σCS-a,CS−i = .2366. Following a similar logic, the impact of CS-incentives
management practices on project completion rates is actually overestimated (γ̂2 ≥ γ2), and so, in
truth, even more negative than our baseline findings suggest, if cov(CS-i,ǫ)
cov(CS-a,ǫ)
≥ σCS-a,CS−i = .2366.
Figure A1 shows the parts of the (cov(CS-i, ǫ), cov(CS-a, ǫ)) parameter space where each condition
can be met. This makes precise that if both management practices are approximately equally
positively correlated with the unobserved factor (so cov(CS-a, ǫ) ≈ cov(CS-i, ǫ) > 0), γ̂1 > γ1 and
we would overestimate the positive impact of CS-autonomy, but it would still be the case that
γ̂2 > γ2 so that, in reality, the impact of CS-incentives is even more negative than estimated. For
the remainder of the discussion, we classify such unobserved factors as arising from other features
of organizations, management practices, and bureaucrats.
5.2.1 Organization Features
We address this concern in Table A7 by continuing to probe the data at the organizational level
using specification (2) to check whether management practices in place correlate to other organi-
zational outcomes beyond project completion rates. Two natural checks follow. First, in Column
3 we construct the average complexity of projects assigned to organization n as our dependent
variable, and then regress this against our measures of management practice and other organiza-
tional characteristics. Neither CS- measure is significantly correlated to the average complexity of
projects the organization is tasked to implement. Hence it is not the case that organizations with
better practices related to autonomy are assigned easier projects, and those with more performance
incentives are assigned harder to implement projects. Second, in Column 4 we use the log of the
organization’s aggregate budget as our dependent variable: again we find no correlation between
the management practices in place and the resources provided to an organization. Hence it is not
the case that organizations that have better practices towards their bureaucrats also command
larger budgets overall, that might otherwise have indicated it was easier for the organization to
complete their assigned projects.
5.2.2 Management Practices
Our management survey tool elicited management practices along nine dimensions in each organi-
zation: roles, flexibility, incentives, monitoring, culture, targeting, facilities, skills and staffing. We
have thus far aggregated these into three measures. We now estimate a specification analogous
to (1) but where we condition on the nine separate dimensions of management practice. This
disaggregated specification serves two purposes: (i) by breaking up the CS-other measure into its
components, it highlights if there are likely to be wider aspects related to how organizations are
functioning, that the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives measures might pick up; (ii) it underpins
the validity of the three-way classification of management practices in our baseline specification.
To begin with in Table A8 we focus on estimating the impact of each dimension separately.
The roles and flexibility subcomponents that formed our CS-autonomy measure are individually
positive and significantly different from zero (Columns 1 and 2). Columns 3 and 4 show that
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each subcomponent that formed the CS-incentives index is negatively and significantly related to
project completion rates. Columns 5 to 9 then split the remaining management practices that were
previously subsumed within the CS-other measure. We see that most of these have no significant
impact on project completion rates.
In Column 10 we simultaneously control for all nine CS- components, and find: (i) both roles
and flexibility components remain positive and individually significantly correlated to project
completion rates, with the impact of roles being significantly larger than for flexibility; (ii) the
incentives component is negative but not significantly different from zero (the point estimate hardly
changes from Column 3 but the standard error almost doubles), while the monitoring component
remains negative and significantly correlated with project completion rates; (iii) the impacts of
the other dimensions of management practice remain rather weak, with four out of five of these
measures not being significantly different from zero.23
The fact that different elements of management practice have positive, zero, or negative impacts
on project completion rates helps allay the concern that the CS- measures used in our core results
simply pick up some unobserved element of management practice. If organizations that employed
the most resourceful and skilled bureaucrats were also those best able to provide autonomy to their
bureaucrats and adapt to new scenarios, then we would be concerned that the partial correlation
between CS-autonomy and project completion rates was being partly confounded by these other
(potentially unobserved) factors. That other dimensions of management practice related to culture
or staffing are uncorrelated with project completion rates, suggests this is not the case.
In Column 11 we aggregate all nine indices into a single metric for ‘good management’, as
considered by BVR for manufacturing firms. In our setting such aggregation leads to the wrong
conclusions being drawn: we find no significant relationship between the aggregate CS-management
measure and project completion rates. The reason for this is clear: the underlying components of
the aggregate index do not all have the same signed impacts on project completion rates. Hence
management of bureaucrats does matter, but different dimensions of management practice have
very different impacts on outcomes in this civil service setting.
5.2.3 Bureaucrat Characteristics
If bureaucrats sort into organizations based on management practices in place, then the impacts
of management practices are confounded by any direct relation between bureaucrat characteristics
and project delivery. In Section 2 we highlighted there are frictions in the labor market for
bureaucrats that limit the scope for individuals to freely join or move across organizations, and
hence this also limits the ability of organizations to use management practices to attract certain
types of bureaucrat. Such selection mechanisms have been argued to be important when evaluating
the impacts of compensation schemes in private sector settings.
In Table A10 we present additional characteristics of bureaucrats elicited in our civil servant
23Another split of practices we considered was to subdivide the practices in CS-incentives into those that refer
to rewards and punishments separately: we find conditional on CS-autonomy and CS-other measures, these sub-
components both have significantly negative partial correlations with project completion rates.
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survey to shed further light on this issue. We aggregate each response to an organizational average.
Column 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of the bureaucrat characteristic for the average
organization. Columns 2 and 3 then show some of the regression coefficients from a specification
analogous to (2), so estimated at the organization level, where the dependent variable is the
organizational average for the reported bureaucrat characteristic, and the reported coefficients are
(θ̂1, θ̂2), the implied effect sizes from the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives management practices,
and their corresponding robust standard errors in parentheses.
The first batch of characteristics probe further the specific social connections bureaucrats might
have with senior staff in the organization to which they are appointed: almost no bureaucrats
report knowing their direct boss, or other managers, prior to their appointment. The lack of
variation in this response precludes it being regressed against the CS- practices. Where there is
more variation is in terms of the number of close colleagues that were known to the individual
prior to their assignment: on average, bureaucrats report knowing 4.40 other colleagues. However,
we find this degree of linkage across bureaucrats, when averaged to the organization level, to
be uncorrelated with the management practices in place related to autonomy and performance
incentives, as shown in Columns 2 and 3.
Our next question uses a more subtle means through which to elicit information on personal
connections among bureaucrats. We asked individuals whether they were the first family member
to join the civil service: 48% of bureaucrats in the average organization report being the first
in their family to be part of the civil service. We find no correlation between this measure of
bureaucrat networks and the management practices in place.
5.3 Endogenous Management Practices
The final set of concerns we address relate to endogenous management practices. If for example
some organization completes projects because they employ more dedicated civil servants, they
might then endogenously choose to give those bureaucrats more autonomy, and be less reliant
on the use of incentives/monitoring. On the other hand, in those organizations staffed by less
reliable bureaucrats, the organization might choose to monitor and incentivize them along some
margins (even if those turn out to be poorly targeted), and allocate them less autonomy. This is
the econometric concern that most plausibly generates the pattern of positive and negative partial
correlations in our core results. We use four strategies to make some headway on this issue.
Our first approach is to consider additional bureaucrat characteristics that might be indicative
of the ‘reliability’ of bureaucrats, as shown in the lower half of Table A10. Throughout, we split
bureaucrat characteristics into those of senior and low-tier bureaucrats, as these different tiers
might differentially impact the management practices in place. Two points are of note: (i) there
is no significant correlation between management practices related to autonomy or performance
incentives and the average tenure of bureaucrats, the proportions of them that report being in-
trinsically motivated, or that report observing corrupt practices on projects; (ii) this is the case
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for characteristics of senior and lower-tier bureaucrats.24
A second approach to measuring bureaucrat ‘types’ and examining whether the distribution
of types in organizations correlate to the management practices in place, is based on responses
to vignettes on scenarios bureaucrats face in service. For example, one vignette we use relates to
a bureaucrat being faced with the following scenario: an official in an organization like theirs is
told by her manager to take funds from a certified project and give them to a contractor/supplier
for projects that the government has yet to complete due process on, against public service rules.
The contractor then does not do the work he was paid for. We asked bureaucrats whether they
agreed/disagreed with various statements related to the vignette: whether the bureaucrat acted
correctly, whether the bureaucrat’s manager acted correctly, whether bureaucrats should some-
times go against rules and so forth. We find little evidence of any significant relationship between
the proportion of bureaucrats that agree with each such statement and the management practices
in place in the organization. If such vignettes are informative of bureaucrat ‘types’, this evidence
suggests that typically harder to observe measures of bureaucrat reliability are not much correlated
with management practices in place.25
Our third approach identifies those organizations that have the greatest incentives to fine tune
their management practices to maximize project completion rates. We think of these organizations
as being those in which the completion of projects is relatively more important in the set of overall
activities the organization is tasked with. We measure this using the share of the organization’s
total budget that is assigned to capital expenditures (such as those on OPEN-style projects). We
then estimate a specification analogous to our baseline model in (1) and additionally interact each
CS- measure with this measure of ‘project importance’ (for expositional ease, this interaction term
is defined in terms of its deviation from mean), also conditioning on the organization’s log total
budget. If management practices are endogenously determined, their impacts might be attenuated
for organizations in which it is more important to fine tune practices to maximize completion rates.
The result in Column 1 of Table A10 finds no evidence of such heterogenous impacts.
Our final approach builds on the results in Figure 1 and identifies those organizations that have
the most similar portfolio of projects to implement, as measured by the projects ambiguity. Such
organizations might have the greatest ability to set their management practices optimally. For
24These results suggest that it is not the case that organizations limit the provision of performance-based in-
centives to attract intrinsically motivated workers [Delfgaauw and Dur 2010], or that the matching of intrinsically
motivated workers to public sector organizations limits the need to use performance-based incentives [Besley and
Ghatak 2005]. Both findings are partly driven by the rigidities in the assignment of bureaucrats to organizations.
25Enumerators stressed there were no right answers to the vignettes, and the question was not an exam, but
an exercise in obtaining the opinions of bureaucrats. The vignette was phrased in reference to a bureaucrat in
the third person (Ngozi). Officials were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements:
(i) ‘Ngozi should have refused to divert the funds and paid the contractors/suppliers/consultant for the certified
project’ (76% agreed); (ii) ‘The contractors/suppliers/consultant should not have accepted the funds given that
Due Process had not been followed’ (68%); (iii) ‘The boss was wrong to direct Ngozi to share the funds of a project
with others’ (81%); (iv) ‘Sometimes it is right to go against strict rules, as Ngozi did, so to make things fairer
or more efficient’ (28%); (v) ‘Bureaucrats should be given more space to interpret what the best action to take
in a given situation is’ (59%). We then check whether there is a significant correlation between the proportion of
bureaucrats that agree with each of the five statements and the two management practices in place: we find that
nine out of ten correlations are not significantly different from zero.
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each organization we construct the variance in project ambiguity over all projects the organization
is tasked to implement. We then estimate whether the impacts of the two CS- measures of interest
are attenuated among those organizations that have the most similar projects in terms of their
design and implementation complexity. The result in Column 2 of Table A10 shows there to be
no evidence of such heterogenous impacts.
6 Discussion
We have studied whether management practices for bureaucrats correlate with effective public
service delivery in an important developing country context: Nigeria.26 We do so by combining
novel project level data measuring the completion, quality and complexity of over 4700 projects
implemented by various civil service organizations, with a management survey in each organiza-
tion. Our primary contribution is thus to provide among the first evidence on whether and how
the management of bureaucrats matters for public service delivery. The relevance of such investi-
gations is first order, given the large number of developing countries engaged in reforming public
bureaucracies along the lines of the ‘good governance’ agenda of the World Bank and United
Nations [Goldfinch et al. 2012, Hasnain et al. 2012].
Our results confirm that the two dimensions of management practice we focus on: autonomy
and performance incentives/monitoring, do indeed correlate to the quantity and quality of public
services delivered, as emphasized by the public administration and economics literatures respec-
tively. Our findings provide support to the notion that public agencies ought to delegate some
decision making to bureaucrats, relying on their professionalism and resolve to deliver public ser-
vices [Simon 1983]. The evidence is less supportive of the notion that when bureaucrats have more
agency or organizations are more flexibly structured, then they are more likely to pursue their own
objectives that diverge from societal interests, resulting in fewer public services being delivered.
The interpretation of the negative correlation of project completion rates with incentives/monitoring
is more nuanced because we measure management practices related to the provision of incentives
and monitoring: we do not necessarily measure the use of explicit compensation schemes based
on project completion. Our extended results provide evidence consistent with two interpretations
of why such management practices have detrimental impacts in this setting: bureaucrats operate
in a multi-tasking environment, and the measured management practices capture an incentive
system that places excessive regulatory burden or ‘red tape’ on bureaucrats (say through the use
of mis-targeted key performance indicators), that has long been argued to lead bureaucrats to
mis-allocate effort towards processing activities [Kelman 1990]. Alternatively, our management
practices related to performance incentives and monitoring pick up elements of subjective per-
formance evaluation, that lead to other dysfunctional responses among bureaucrats, especially
engagement in influencing activities to curry favor with senior management.
To the extent that the day-to-day work of bureaucrats in other contexts is also characterized as
26We also add to a nascent literature utilizing the BVR approach to measure management practices in non-profits
including hospitals [Bloom et al. 2013] and universities [McCormack et al. 2013].
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multi-tasking environments in which processing and productive efforts can be exerted, our results
will have some external validity to those settings. Moreover, there will nearly always be scope
for the use of SPE in bureaucratic environments in which it is difficult to measure outputs, or
to attribute outputs to the inputs of specific individuals. As such, our results sound a word of
caution to the good governance agenda: the provision of incentives and monitoring will be effective
only if such schemes are well tailored to the specific bureaucratic context. The simple import of
practices from private sector settings might lead to dysfunctional responses among bureaucrats of
the nature we document. Moreover, the broad design of management practices needs to be jointly
considered with reforms to wider civil service practices along margins that might prevent such
practices being fine tuned to their optimal designs, as discussed below.
Our results point to new directions for theoretical research to better understand the contract-
ing environment in public bureaucracies, as well as highlighting specific areas in which better
measurement of inputs and outputs can aid our understanding of public service provision in the
developing world.27 In this final Section we discuss the implications of our findings for understand-
ing optimal management practices in public bureaucracies, and highlight two important directions
for future research: on the methodology of collecting management practices for bureaucrats, and
the interplay between such practices and other mechanisms to improve public service delivery.
6.1 Optimal Management Practices
Our core results suggest there are potentially huge gains to be made from marginal changes in
management practices. This naturally begs the question of why civil service organizations are not
optimizing over management practices to begin with. In our context, a fundamental source of this
inefficiency arises from organizations being tasked to implement many project types (Table 2).
As Figure 1 highlights, project types have very different characteristics and so it is unlikely that
there exists a unique set of optimal management practices any organization could have in place.
This lack of specialization in tasks across civil service organizations is an underlying reason why
management practices still matter on the margin.
A second explanation is based on a Weberian view, that organizations might well be optimizing
their management practices according to whatever is their true objective, and our evidence merely
suggests this objective is only weakly aligned with maximizing project completion rates. To
check for this, we have investigated whether the management practices correlate to the frequency
with which bureaucrats report performing other functions, such as engaging with politicians, or
engaging with citizens/civil society groups, but we find no such correlations. Moreover, we have
previously noted that the type of projects we study constitute almost half the total budgets of
these civil service organizations, so their completion is likely to be weighted to some extent in the
objectives of the organization, but it is by no means their sole objective.28
27Dixit [2002] discusses that optimal management practices can differ in public and private sectors because of
the existence of multiple principals, multiple tasks, a lack of competition, and motivated agents.
28To further assess the degree of alignment in organization with project completion rates, we regressed the log of
project budgets on each of the 16 subcomponents of the project complexity indicator, as shown in Table A3. The
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As discussed by BVR for private sector firms, suboptimal management practices might also
persist in equilibrium despite the resultant loss of efficiency because: (i) the fixed costs of adopting
better practices; (ii) best management practices might be heterogeneous across organizations. On
the first point, to derive an estimate of the required fixed cost of changing management practices,
we note the sum of capital expenditures for all projects from the 63 organizations studied is
$3,694mn. Focusing on the impacts of management practices on those 38% of projects that never
start, assuming a linear relationship between costs and completion rates, and taking the marginal
impacts from Table 3 of a one standard deviation change in each management practice, implies
there would need to be fixed cost per organization of around (.38× .32× 3, 694)/63 =$7.13mn for
such a move not to occur for this reason alone.29
The second point has been examined when we explored the heterogeneous impacts of manage-
ment practices in Section 4.2. Those results imply the optimal performance incentives in place
should partly reflect the complexity and ambiguity of projects in an organization’s portfolio, the
use of IT facilities, as well as the tenure and intrinsic motivation of its bureaucrats. However, in
contrast to this evidence, these issues were not at the fore during the semi-structured interviews
we conducted at organizations to better our understanding of what drives management practices
in reality. These all highlighted how practices evolve slowly over time as a function of ground rules
laid out in the Public Service Rules of the Nigerian civil service, the history of senior management
staff in an organization, and external events such as trade union demands. As further discussed
in BVR, inefficient management practices might also persist for dynamic reasons: learning and
adjustment costs might cause best practice to diffuse over time. This is in line with the evidence
discussed throughout on the frictions in the labor market for bureaucrats related to the initial
assignment and immobility across organizations of bureaucrats.
Finally, a particularly acute concern is that a lack of competitive pressure enables poorly man-
aged public sector organizations to survive. This might especially be true in developing country
contexts where mechanisms are rarely in place to allow citizens to choose across alternative public
providers of a given good or service. We return to this issue below when discussing alternative
mechanisms through which public service delivery can be improved.30
6.2 Other Mechanisms To Improve Public Sector Delivery
Our analysis fits within a broader literature documenting mechanisms to improve public service
delivery in developing countries. There are at least two additional mechanisms that can interplay
with the management practices for bureaucrats within organizations. First, there remains much
residuals from this regression, that might capture the rents to be gained from the project if it is completed, are
found to be weakly positively correlated with actual project completion rates, with a correlation of .13.
29This is a lower bound estimate because, as discussed in the Appendix, the impacts of management practice on
project completion rates apply not only at the margin of ensuring projects are started, but have similar impacts
at all thresholds of project completion rate.
30In the private sector, Bloom et al. [2012] provide evidence that product market competition drives innovations
towards more better management practices. Bloom et al. [2013] find evidence that hospitals that face competition
for patients from rival hospitals do indeed adopt better management practices.
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scope to combine and jointly test models of selection into, and turnover of bureaucrats between,
public sector organizations. On selection into the civil service, our findings highlight there can be
an interplay between the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats and how they respond to management
practices. On turnover, bureaucratic tenure is important both because longer serving bureaucrats
shape the management practices in place, but they might also react differently to any given set
of incentives, as highlighted in Table 4. A recent contribution in this direction is Dal Bo et al.
[2013] who present evidence from Mexico, exploiting experimental variation in salaries to identify
their impact on the selection of public sector officials. They find higher wages attracted more able
workers, and that there are no adverse selection impacts in terms of motivation. This evidence
complements our findings on the impact of management practices once bureaucrats are hired.
Second, the role of grass roots monitoring or accountability of public service providers is im-
portant and likely interplays with management practices in place. Bjorkman and Svensson [2009]
present evidence from an RCT in Uganda on how community based monitoring of primary health
care providers led to large increases in utilization of services and improved health outcomes: in
part these findings are driven by changes in the behavior of health providers themselves. Reinikka
and Svensson [2011] and Duflo et al. [2012] provide other examples of the gains to public service
delivery to be had from bottom-up monitoring of frontline public sector workers. On the other
hand, such findings are not uniform: Olken [2007] finds more muted impacts of community based
monitoring on reducing corruption in road infrastructure projects in Indonesia. Rather, top-down
audits are effective in reducing corruption on such locally organized public works projects. Along
the same lines of top-down monitoring, Besley and Burgess [2002] and Ferraz and Finan [2008]
have documented the significant role that media scrutiny can play for public service provision.31
We view there to be a rich future agenda for understanding public service delivery — in rich and
poor countries — that effectively links incentives and practices in civil service organizations, the
selection and retention of bureaucrats, and public monitoring and accountability of organizations.
A Appendix
A.1 Measuring Project Complexity
Data on the complexity of government projects is not directly part of the OPEN data set. We thus
worked with a pair of Nigerian engineers familiar with the OPEN projects and a number of inter-
national researchers working on technical complexity to define a relevant set of indicators based
on the technical documents for each OPEN project. We followed the perspectives on complexity
suggested by Remington and Pollack [2007], by asking the engineer-assessors to individually assess
projects along the following five topics, each with their own set of indicators.
31Evidence from our civil servants survey confirms that bureaucrats do regularly engage with community groups
and so such bottom-up approaches might well interplay with management practices in place. For example, 24% of
surveyed bureaucrats reported personally engaging with community/religious groups; 11% reported engaging with
members of the National Assembly.
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Structural complexity stems from the scale of different interconnected tasks and activities. The
indicators associated with this topic capture structural aspects such as project size and the number
of inputs required for production. They also capture issues in raw material and labour supply, and
the ease with which any necessary specialized skills and equipment can be sourced. Temporally
complex projects are those whose production involves uncertainties. Hence there are indicators
for uncertainties in design and implementation. Technically complex projects are those whose
production have ambiguous risks, namely their uncertainties are not well understood. Hence some
indicators capture ambiguities in design and implementation. Directional complexity refers to the
potential for preferences over the project to diverge. The engineer assessors are thus asked to
rate the managerial complexities of the project. Finally, there is a subjective assessment as to
the overall complexity of the project. This allows any unassessed aspects of complexity to be
measured and provides a coherent picture of project complexity.
Two qualified and independent Nigerian engineers were then contracted to assess each project
in the OPEN data set along these margins. The process of aggregation between engineers used in
this project aimed to build a consensus. The first engineer coded indicators for the entire data set.
The codings of the first engineer were then provided to the second engineer who then constructed
his own codings with reference to the codings of the first. The aim was to anchor the coding of
the second engineer in that of the first but give him freedom to disagree where he felt the coding
was incorrect. Other methods would have been to have them code independently and average the
two data sets or to have them work together. We decided our approach was a balance between
consensus and subjectivity.
The two engineers were provided with project details and documents and asked to code a value
for each indicator. The documents only contained information available before implementation
such that there was no bias from the coding being done after the projects were implemented.
Table A3 provides descriptive statistics for all 16 indicators from which the complexity index
is constructed, as well as how each is correlated with the other indicators. Aggregate complexity
is a subjective assessment of the overall complexity of the projects by the two engineers, that
includes ‘all factors that might influence the difficulty of implementing the project, not only those
assessed [by the other indicators]’. We asked the engineers to take the distribution of complexity
in the OPEN data set as a whole, with the least complex project in the data having an aggregate
complexity of zero and the most complex project having an aggregate complexity of 100, and place
each project within this distribution.
We undertook a number of measures to check the complexity of the OPEN indicators coded by
the engineers. First, we inserted 200 randomly chosen repeated projects into the data set provided
to the engineers. Since the project characteristics of the original and repeat projects are identical,
we would expect that the codings of the two sets of projects would be similar. Reassuringly, we
find that in general the original and duplicate projects are coded in similar ways. We compare the
differences between these two sets by looking at group and paired means, and distributional tests
for each variable. The differences are only statistically significant at conventional levels in a few
cases, and the magnitude of the differences are relatively small. For example, the only variable
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that is statistically significantly different below the 10% level in the mean-comparison t-test relates
to raw material storage. Here, despite a standard deviation of 0.2 in the originals, the difference
is 0.07 between the originals and the duplicates.
Second, we looked at the similarity of the codings of the two engineers. We find that the second
engineer’s codings are not dramatically different from the first engineer’s efforts. Whilst there are
a small number of differences, they are relatively small and rarely significant, indicating that the
re-coding left the overall picture relatively stable.
Finally, over a year after he had completed the prompted codings, we asked the second engineer
to re-code a sub-sample of projects from scratch, this time without prompting. The differences
between these independent codings and the consensus data we rely on are again relatively minor.
It seems that once he had become accustomed to the broad parameters of the coding framework,
the second engineer’s coding was not dissimilar to the consensus generated by the two engineers
working one after the other.
We therefore have evidence of similar projects within the data set being coded in a similar
way, of the two engineers coding in similar ways both when prompted and unprompted, and when
there were deviations, of the deviations not being particularly quantitatively large. Taken together
these checks reassure us that the complexity measures pick up meaningful variation across projects,
rather than merely picking up noise that should have led to the multiple reports (either across
engineers or over time) being uncorrelated.
A.2 Standard Errors
Our baseline specification assumes the disturbance term is clustered by project type-organization.
This might capture best the nature of unobserved factors that relate to project completion rates,
such as the quality of the sub-departments in each organization that are tasked with the same
project types. In Table A4 we show the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions on
the error structure. The table is structured to cover the same specifications as in Columns 1 to 4
of Table 3, but where we now report standard errors based on alternative assumptions: (i) robust
standard errors; (ii) errors clustered by project-type and organization as in Table 3; (iii) standard
errors clustered by organization. One concern with such clustered standard errors is that they may
be downwards biased when the number of clusters is small (and in our specification the number of
clusters corresponds to 63) [Cameron et al. 2008]. They propose various asymptotic refinements
using bootstrap techniques, finding the wild cluster bootstrap-t technique performs particularly
well in Monte Carlo simulations. We have implemented this method on our baseline specifications
and show in brackets in Columns 1 to 4 the resulting p-values. This correction does not alter
the significance of any of the coefficients from our preferred specification with project fixed effects
shown in Column 4 of Table A3.
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A.3 Robustness Checks
We conduct a range of robustness checks on our core result on project completion rates, shown
in Column 4 of Table 3. To begin with we note that the results in Table 3 used our continuous
measure of project completion rates (from zero to one) as the dependent variable. However, an
alternative approach is to define a threshold of completion that would deem the project usable.
To do so we consider all potential thresholds from 1% to 100% in increments of 1% and then
estimate a specification analogous to (1) where yijn is defined as a dummy variable equal to one
if the project completion rate is above the given threshold p%, and zero otherwise. For any given
threshold p the coefficients of interest are denoted γ1p and γ2p. Figure A2 then plots each pair of
(γ̂1p,γ̂2p) estimates, for each threshold and their associated 95% confidence interval.
Two points are of note. First, at the extreme left of the figure where we consider a 1% threshold,
we are essentially using a linear probability model to assess the relationship between management
practices in civil service organizations and whether projects are started in some way. Here we
find marginal impacts of each type of management practice to be qualitatively similar to those
documented earlier for the average completion rate, although the point estimate on CS-autonomy
seems to be lower than the baseline specification.32 Second, we cannot reject the null that the sign
and significance of the coefficients are the same for every threshold of project completion. Taken
together, the results imply that managerial incentives along both margins have similar impacts on
the extensive margin of public service delivery (namely whether projects are started at all) and
the intensive margins of project completion (namely the extent to which projects are completed).
The checks detailed in Table A5 all verify the robustness of our main finding to alterative
samples of organizations and projects: Column 1 excludes those projects implemented by the
largest organization in terms of total expenditures. Column 2 excludes projects implemented by
the largest organization in terms of total expenditures. Columns 3 and 4 remove the 10 smallest
organizations by expenditures and number of projects respectively. Columns 5 and 6 exclude
organizations at the top and bottom of the CS-autonomy and CS-incentives management scales
respectively. In each cut of the data, the core results remain stable, so that our findings do not
appear to be drive by outlier or specific organizations.
The third series of robustness checks in all probe the core results in alternative subsamples
of data (with the caveat that such splits of the data inevitably lead to less precise estimates).
Columns 7 and 8 in Table A5 break down the project types listed in Table 1 into two groups:
those related to construction projects (borehole, building, electrification, dam, road and canal)
and those related to non-construction projects. We find that for construction projects, the results
closely replicate the baseline findings. Indeed, for construction projects as a whole the point
estimates on each management practice index is slightly larger in absolute value than the baseline
result in Column 4 of Table 3. For non-construction projects, the results show that CS- autonomy
32The result needs to be interpreted carefully. There is not continuous mass in project completion rates over
the [0,1] interval: hence we do not expect the marginal impact of the each management practice to be sensitive
to marginal changes in threshold p where there is little mass in project completion rates. This explains why the
marginal impacts shown in Figure A2 jump at a small number of points.
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continues to have a positive and significant impact on project completion rates; CS-incentives has a
negative correlation with project completion rates that is significant at the 10% level. As suggested
by Figure 1, this might be because non-construction projects such as training and procurement,
are inherently less ambiguous in design.
The next split considered in Columns 9 and 10 is between centralized and decentralized civil
service organizations, where centralized agencies correspond to government ministries. We see the
impacts of CS-autonomy to be similar in both, although the CS-index index only has negative
impacts in the centralized agencies. This latter result is worth exploring in future work.
The next robustness check addresses the concern that different management practices might be
spread across the country in a way that is correlated with characteristics of the organization’s local
geographies. Indeed, it is well understood that the characteristics of local populations interplay
with them being able to solve collective action problems, and thus are an important driver of public
goods provision [Banerjee et al. 2007]. To address this issue, Column 11 additionally controls for
a wide variety of state-level controls for each project and finds almost no change in the coefficients
of interest. In short, local area characteristics do not seem to be driving our results.33 Columns
12 and 13 split the sample into projects that are located in the Northern and Southern regions
of Nigeria respectively, that characterizes the first order cultural divide in Nigeria, and provides a
relatively even split in the number of projects. We find the impacts of both management practices
to remain significant in both regions. This suggests that cultural differences across regions do not
much interact with responses to these management practices.
The final two robustness checks relate to methodological issues. First, we consider alternative
constructions of the CS- management practice indices. As described in Section 3.3, following
BVR, we aggregated responses to individuals questions to construct our indices of management
practices giving equal weight to all questions. A natural alternative is to cluster the variables
into the various management topics described in Table A2 and weight each topic (rather than
each variable) equally. We re-construct our CS-autonomy and CS-incentives measures along these
lines and reestimate our preferred specification (1). The result, in Column 14 of Table A5 is
qualitatively in line with our baseline results, although the absolute magnitude of each measure of
public sector management is larger : a one standard deviation increase in CS-autonomy corresponds
to a significantly higher project completion rate of 23%, and a one standard deviation increase in
CS-incentives corresponds to a significantly lower project completion rate of 14%.
The analysis has so far estimated (1) using OLS. The final robustness check estimates this
specification using a fractional regression model that accounts for the dependent variable being
a continuous variable between zero and one. To do so, we utilize Papke and Wooldridge’s [1996]
fractional logit model in which the conditional expectation function is modelled as a logistic
function that can take all values in the unit interval. The interpretation of the marginal effects
are the same as in the binary logit model and evaluated at sample averages, the partial effects are
approximately comparable to the coefficients from a linear regression. The result in Column 15 of
33The sample drops slightly in this specification because the state in which the project is located (or should have
been located for those projects that are never started) is missing for around 450 projects.
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Table A5 shows our core findings to be robust to this alternative estimation model.
A.4 The Assignment of Projects to Organizations
A central econometric concern addressed in Section 5.1 is that the assignment of projects to
organizations might correlate to the management practices in place. For example, projects for
which there is concerted political pressure to complete might be allocated to better managed or-
ganizations, all else equal. To investigate the issue we use a conditional logit model to directly
estimate the likelihood of project i being assigned to organization n conditional on the manage-
ment practices for bureaucrats in place in the organization, and other project and organizational
characteristics exploited in our analysis.
To do so we first reshape our data as follows: for each project we created a binary variable
with 63 values corresponding to our 63 organizations. The variable, denoted Din, takes the value
one for the organization at which that project is actually assigned, and zero otherwise. Thus, the
data-set is at the project-organization pair level (in), with a total of 4721×63 = 297, 423 project-
organization paired observations. To each observation, we attach the relevant organization-level
characteristics used in our analysis (that were denoted OCn in (1)), such as our management
indices, capital controls and organizational averages of bureaucrat characteristics. We then also
consider whether specific project-organization interactions, denoted Zin, correlate with the assign-
ment of projects to organizations. We estimate a conditional logit specification for Prob(Din = 1),
based on both sets of characteristics;
prob[Din = 1] =
exp(β ′OCn + γ
′Zin)∑
n
exp(β′OCn + γ′Zin)
. (5)
Note that in this modelling framework project characteristics play no role as these do not vary
within a given project i over the organizations n it could potentially have been assigned to.
We run three sets of specifications. The first takes the perspective that each project could have
been assigned to any of our 63 organizations. The second takes the perspective that projects can
only be implemented by organizations of the same sector. Thus, health projects could only be
implemented by health sector organizations for example. When we impose this restriction on the
permissible project-organization pairs, we lose 847 projects as there is only one organization of that
sector in our data, and there are 44, 429 potential within sector project-organization pairs. The
third specification further imposes the assumption that projects can only potentially be assigned
to organizations in the same sector that are observed being tasked to implement a project of the
same complexity. This further reduces the sample to 33, 480 feasible project-organization pairs.
In all specifications we cluster standard errors by organization as there are likely to be unobserved
characteristics of organizations that determine project assignments.
Table A6 presents the results. Column 1 utilizes the entire set of project-organization combina-
tions and uses only our management scores in the regression. Unconditional on other organization
characteristics, neither management practice related to autonomy or performance-based incentives
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significantly predicts the assignment of projects to organizations. When we restrict the sample
so that each project can only feasibly be assigned to organizations in the same sector, Column 2
shows the coefficient on CS-autonomy to become significant at the 10% level, but this result is not
robust. In Column 3 where we restrict the feasible pairs also using information on the complexity
of projects, we find the probability of projects being assigned to organizations do not significantly
correlate with the management practices in place in the organization.
Column 4 extends the specification to include all the organizational controls utilized in our
baseline specification in Table 3 (capital, general and noise), as well as the full set of organizational
controls that we use elsewhere in the paper. The coefficients on the management practices remain
insignificantly different from zero at the usual levels. Moreover, we find no evidence that any
of these other organizational characteristics predict the assignment of a given project to that
particular organization rather than other organizations it could feasibly have been assigned to.
In Column 5 we additionally control for a series of interactions between project characteristics
(scale, complexity) and organizational characteristics (total staff, total budget). Some of these
project-organization interactions do predict the assignment of projects. As is intuitive, we find
that the interactions between the number of staff at an organization and the project budget,
and the organization’s total budget and the project complexity, both are positive and significant
predictors of project assignment. Over and above these interactions, we continue to find no impact
of management practices on project assignment even once we allow for specific matched pairs to
be assigned in this way.
Overall, these results suggest our results are not reflecting the non-random selection of projects
to organizations based on their management practices. While there is no doubt some complex
bargaining process between Parliament, civil service organizations and other stakeholders that de-
termined the assignment of projects to locations and organizations, on the margin, this assignment
is uncorrelated with the management practices in place in implementing organizations.
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Table 1: Descriptive Evidence on Project Types
Project Type
(1) Number of 
Projects 
[Proportion]
(2) Number of 
Implementing 
Organizations
(3) Median 
Budget Allocation 
(US$000s)
(4) Proportion 
Never Started
(5) Average 
Completion 
Rate
(6) Proportion 
Completed 
Conditional on 
Being Started
(7) Proportion 
Fully 
Completed
(8) Proportion With 
Satisfactory Quality
Borehole 1348 [0.29] 18 29 0.44 0.47 0.84 0.37 0.85
Building 806 [0.17] 32 120 0.37 0.50 0.79 0.34 0.81
Electrification 751 [0.16] 2 93 0.14 0.56 0.65 0.25 0.87
Dam 624 [0.13] 14 18 0.79 0.15 0.74 0.10 0.50
Procurement 345 [0.07] 41 87 0.30 0.58 0.83 0.47 0.85
Road 217 [0.05] 4 167 0.12 0.52 0.59 0.22 0.79
Training 189 [0.04] 26 80 0.20 0.60 0.74 0.42 0.84
Financial project 157 [0.03] 8 17 0.38 0.49 0.79 0.35 0.84
Research 122 [0.03] 21 67 0.11 0.63 0.72 0.52 0.99
Advocacy 86 [0.02] 23 49 0.24 0.61 0.80 0.47 0.94
Canal 76 [0.02] 12 347 0.70 0.14 0.45 0.05 0.92
Notes: The “project type” classification refers to the primary classification for each project. Other project classifications exist. The median budget allocation in Column 3 is in thousands of US Dollars (assuming an exchange rate of US$1:
Naira 150). The sample of projects covers those which have a positive budget allocation and for which the proportion completed evaluation variable and management scores are available. The project quality variable in Column 8 is not
available for all projects. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Figures are rounded to two decimal places where relevant.
Table 2: Descriptive Evidence on Largest Civil Service Implementing Organizations
Civil Service Organization
(1) Number 
of Projects
(2) Number 
of Unique 
Project 
Types
(3) Budget 
Allocation 
(US$mn)
(4) Proportion 
Never Started
(5) Proportion 
Completed
(6) Proportion 
Completed 
Conditional on 
Being Started
(7) Proportion 
Fully 
Completed
(8) Proportion 
With Satisfactory 
Quality
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 797 9 144 0.54 0.29 0.63 0.14 0.76
Federal Ministry of Power and Steel 750 1 490 0.14 0.56 0.25 0.65 0.87
Federal Ministry of Water Resources 520 4 426 0.95 0.04 0.77 0.03 0.69
National Primary Health Care Development 447 4 56 0.19 0.64 0.79 0.42 0.75
Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority 277 2 23 0.22 0.66 0.85 0.51 0.76
Upper Benue River Basin Development Authority 169 3 13 0.11 0.89 1.00 0.89 0.25
Ogun/Oshun River Basin Development Authority 165 4 22 0.55 0.32 0.71 0.24 0.89
Chad Basin River Basin Development Authority 148 3 16 0.43 0.56 1.00 0.56 1.00
Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority 143 3 16 0.45 0.42 0.77 0.17 0.86
Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development 
Bank
133 2 8 0.42 0.46 0.80 0.34 0.81
 
Notes: The sample covers the ten largest civil service organizations ranked by number of projects from our overall sample of projects. The “project type” classification refers to the primary classification for each project. Other project classifications exist. The budget
allocation in Column 3 is in millions of US Dollars (assuming an exchange rate of US$1: Naira 150). The sample of projects covers those which have a positive budget allocation and for which the proportion completed evaluation variable and management scores are
available. The project quality variable in Column 8 is not available for all projects. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Figures are rounded to two decimal places where relevant.
Table 3: Management Practices and Public Sector Service Delivery
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Unconditional
(2) Organization 
Controls
(3) Project 
Controls
(4) Project Type 
Fixed Effects
(5) Quality-Adjusted 
Completion Rate
(6) Interaction
CS-Autonomy 0.11** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.11** 0.23***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.06* -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.14*** -0.08*** -0.15***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CS-Other 0.10*** 0.05 0.05 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CS-Autonomy x CS-Incentives 0.06**
(0.02)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None None None Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 2206 (144) 4721 (201)
Project Completion Rates
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS
estimates. The dependent variable in Columns 1 to 4 and 6 is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). The dependent variable in Column 5 is the
product of the proportion completed variable and the dummy variable for quality. The sample of projects in Column 5 is limited to those for which project completion and quality data is available. Project
Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or road project.
Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital
controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce
with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who
responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the
duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Note that no quality information is available for organizations surveyed on a Saturday, and thus
the dummy variable indicating a survey took place on a Saturday is omitted in Column 5. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures
are rounded to two decimal places.
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Interactions in Deviation from Mean in Columns 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6
OLS Estimates
(1) Project 
Complexity
(2) Non-modal 
Project
(3) Facilities (4) Tenure
(5) Intrinsic 
Motivation
(6) Observe 
Corrupt Practices
CS-Autonomy 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.16***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CS-Other 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
CS-Incentives x Project Complexity -0.19***
(0.06)
CS-Incentives x Non-modal Project Type -0.05*
(0.03)
CS-Incentives x CS-Facilities 0.03*
(0.02)
CS-Other (Without Facilities) 0.09***
(0.03)
CS-Facilities 0.01
(0.02)
CS-Incentives x Average Tenure of Bureaucrats -0.02***
(0.004)
CS-Incentives x Proportion of Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.54**
(0.22)
CS-Incentives x Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report Observing Corrupt Practices On 0.25
(0.28)
Project Complexity -0.01 0.05
(0.11) (0.12)
Project of Non-modal Type for Organization -0.04
(0.03)
Average Tenure of Bureaucrats -0.01
(0.01)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated -0.47
(0.33)
Proportion of Projects that Bureaucrats Report Observing Corrupt Practices On -1.09***
(0.37)
Organization Controls (capital, general, 
noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All
columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed
effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or
road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate
complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls
comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four
interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the
interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of
the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. In Column 1, the aggregate
complexity is a project-level subjective assessment by Nigerian engineers of the relative difficulty of the project within the population of OPEN projects. In Column 2, the non-
modal project type is a binary indicator as to whether the project is of a different project type (as defined above) as the modal project type at the organisation. In Column 4,
tenure is an organization-level average for the number of years officials have worked at the implementing organization. In Column 5, intrinsic motivation is an organization-level
proportion of employees at an organization that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?' in the
Civil Servants Survey. In Column 6, observation of corrupt practices is an organization-level average of the proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I
observed others breaking the service rules for their own benefit' in the Civil Servants Survey. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table 4: Heterogeneous Impacts of Management Practices Related to Incentives and 
Monitoring
Figure 1: Project Ambiguity and the Response to CS-Incentive Management Practices
Notes: The horizontal axis measures the ambiguity of projects of a given type. We measure this design ambiguity using subcomponents of the complexity indicator described in Table
A3. In particular we construct a z-score based on the design uncertainty, implementation uncertainty, design ambiguity and implementation ambiguity components of the project
complexity metric. We then take the average of this over all projects of type j, denoting the average ambiguity of projects of type j by σj. We then estimate a specification analogous to
our baseline regression model for a given project type j (excluding project fixed effects). We do so for five project types: boreholes, buildings, dams, procurement and training. For
each project type j we then obtain an estimate of the partial correlation between CS-incentives and project completion rates, γ2j, conditional on CS-autonomy. Figure 1 then plots the
five (γ2j,σj) pairs, as well as a cubic best fit.
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
Boreholes 
Buildings 
Dams 
Procurement 
Training 
j

j2
ˆ
Increasing Ambiguity 
M
ar
gi
n
al
 Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
C
S-
in
ce
n
ti
ve
s 
Table A1: Federal Civil Service Organizations Under Study
Civil Service Organization Sector
Annual Budget 
(US$)
Number 
of Staff
Level of 
Centralization
Anambra/Imo River Basin Development Authority Water 26,651,696 324 Deconcentrated
Benin Owena River Basin Development Authority Water 17,637,829 333 Deconcentrated
Chad Basin River Basin Development Authority Water 15,781,353 399 Deconcentrated
Cross River River Basin Development Authority Water 18,823,211 318 Deconcentrated
Citizenship and Leadership Training Centre Youth 3,510,409 601 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Gombe Education 5,319,472 608 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Gusau Education 4,665,009 379 Deconcentrated
Federal College of Education, Omuku Education 5,887,740 699 Deconcentrated
Federal Government Girls College, Gboko Education 1,233,030 161 Deconcentrated
Federal Government Girls College, Lejja Education 1,325,661 122 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Abeokuta Health 6,459,959 1,646 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Asaba Health 4,957,423 777 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Bayelsa State Health 5,026,215 725 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Bida Health 4,135,214 709 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Ebute Metta Health 5,358,665 958 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Gombe Health 5,640,897 1,518 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Kebbi State Health 3,560,097 528 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Makurdi Health 7,120,460 955 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Nasarawa State Health 4,572,968 785 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Owerri Health 8,709,623 1,722 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Owo Health 8,219,773 1,119 Deconcentrated
Federal Medical Centre, Umuahia Health 7,157,419 1,306 Deconcentrated
Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Agriculture 144,055,160 5,789 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Education Education 44,055,244 2,776 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Environment Environment 20,324,048 2,093 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Federal Capital Territory Administration Education 473,280,702 18,987 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Health Health 170,406,214 3,871 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development Housing 58,610,300 7,837 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Youth Development and Special Duties Youth 11,233,012 392 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Power and Steel Power 490,123,985 580 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Water Resources Water 425,805,770 740 Concentrated
Federal Ministry of Women Affairs Women 14,934,361 577 Concentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Bida Education 4,766,557 1,025 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Ede Education 5,111,209 706 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Idah Education 7,643,274 987 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Nasarawa Education 6,431,211 810 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Nekede Education 9,104,663 1,282 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Offa Education 5,397,664 673 Deconcentrated
Federal Polytechnic, Oko Education 11,266,398 1,627 Deconcentrated
Federal Staff Hospital, Apo-Abuja Health 2,439,537 471 Deconcentrated
Hadejia-Jama'are River Basin Development Authority Water 32,758,143 589 Deconcentrated
Jos University Teaching Hospital Health 19,008,930 2,261 Deconcentrated
Lower Benue River Basin Development Authority Water 16,307,146 347 Deconcentrated
Lower Niger River Basin Development Authority Water 18,954,248 436 Deconcentrated
Mass Literacy Commission Education 6,706,812 154 Deconcentrated
National Action Committee on Aids Health 12,554,883 243 Deconcentrated
National Arbovirus and Vector Research Health 301,502 207 Deconcentrated
National Board for Technical Education Education 10,956,835 460 Deconcentrated
National Centre for Women Development Women 1,430,538 135 Deconcentrated
National Commission for Colleges of Education Education 5,633,851 222 Deconcentrated
National Commission for Nomadic Education Education 4,159,863 195 Deconcentrated
National Primary Health Care Development Health 56,036,340 646 Deconcentrated
National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Referred Hospital and Training Centre, Zaria Health 3,000,639 153 Deconcentrated
National Teachers Institute Education 33,613,921 728 Deconcentrated
National Youth Service Corps Youth 121,389,773 103,686 Deconcentrated
Niger Delta River Basin Development Authority Water 18,600,953 406 Deconcentrated
Nigerian Agricultural Cooperative and Rural Development Bank Agriculture 7,798,094 474 Deconcentrated
Ogun/Oshun River Basin Development Authority Water 22,259,121 285 Deconcentrated
Sokoto Rima River Basin Development Authority Water 23,430,400 566 Deconcentrated
Specialist Hospital, Gwagwalada Health 10,953,476 1,275 Deconcentrated
Universal Basic Education Commission Education 50,549,049 393 Deconcentrated
Upper Benue River Basin Development Authority Water 12,822,263 272 Deconcentrated
Upper Niger River Basin Development Authority Water 21,951,907 239 Deconcentrated
Notes: The budget figures are averages for 2006 to 2010. They are in US Dollars exchanged at a rate of US$1: Naira 150. Staff numbers come from administrative data for 2010. In the few cases
we do not have the staff numbers explicitly, we estimate them from the personnel expenditures, which have are correlated with staff numbers with a coefficient of over 0.9. Concentrated
organizations refer to the central organizing authority for the sector, with a direct line of responsibility to the President and the National Assembly. Deconcentrated organizations refer to those whose
day-to-day running is largely independent of the central authority. They have boards of governors that make decisions over policy and operation and a separate budget line to the central ministries.
Table A2: Defining Management Practices Using the CS Indices
Management Practice Topic Specific Questions Related to this Topic
CS-Autonomy Roles
Can most staff above SGL 7 in your organization make substantive contributions to the policy formulation and 
implementation process?
Can most staff above SGL 15 in your organization make substantive contributions to the policy formulation and 
implementation process?
To what extent do the employees in this organization have the ability to determine how they carry out the 
assignments in their daily work?
Flexibility
Does your organization make efforts to redefine its standard procedures in response to the specific needs and 
peculiarities of a community?
How flexible would you say your organization is in terms of responding to new practices, new techniques, and 
regulations?
At your organization, how efficiently is best practice shared between departments?
Given past experience, how effectively would a conflict within your organization be dealt with?
CS-Incentives Given past experience, how would under-performance be tolerated?
Given past experience, what happens if there is a part of your organization that isn’t achieving agreed results?
What percentage of workers  were rewarded when targets were met?
What percentage of managers/directors  were rewarded when targets were met?
Given past experience, are members of this organization disciplined for breaking the Public Service Rules?
Given past experience, what would most likely happen to a person in this organization who accepted money or a 
present from someone who came to them with a problem?
Monitoring In what kind of ways does your organization track how well it is delivering services?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators collected?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators reviewed by Minister or Permanent Secretary?
If have performance indicators, how often are these indicators reviewed by non managerial staff?
Does the organization use performance or quality indicators for tracking the performance of its employees?
At your organization, how highly regarded is the collection and use of data in planning and implementing projects?
CS-Other Facilities During a typical working day (8 hours from 8am to 4pm), how many hours is there electricity (PHCN or generator)?
Out of the five [5] working days, how many days is the network (GSM) coverage working for 50% of calls or more?
Out of the five [5] working days, how many hours is their internet access good enough to check e-mail?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many have access to a computer (desktop or laptop)?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many have access to a vehicle (privately owned or otherwise) that 
can be used for work?
Skills Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to write a memo?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to create a PowerPoint presentation?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many can use a computer to create an Excel spreadsheet?
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Technical trainings.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Laws and regulations.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Legal rights of the 
public.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Good relations with the 
public.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  Ethics.
On which topics have trainings been performed at your organization in the last five [5] years?  What to do with 
presents.
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7 at your organization, how many have had some form of training over the 
last five [5] years?
Staffing Do you think the most senior staff of your organization talk about attracting and developing talented people?
Do you think the most senior staff of your organization then actually goes about attracting and developing talented 
people?
If two people both joined your organization five years ago and one was much better at their work than the other, 
would he/she be promoted through the service faster?
Given past experience, if there is a ‘top performing’ civil servant, does your organization do their best to keep 
him/her?
Is the burden of achieving the organization's targets evenly distributed across its different departments, or do some 
groups consistently shoulder a greater burden than others?
How do you feel the number of staff in your organization relates to the activities undertaken there?
What percentage of staff is doing most of the work at your organization?
Thinking about all the projects that your organization has been involved in since your appointment here, would you 
say that senior staff try to use the right staff for the right job?
Targeting Does your organization have a clear set of targets derived from its mission and goals?
How tough are the targets of the organization?
When you arrive at work each day, do you and your colleagues know what your organization is trying to achieve on 
that particular day?
Culture How effectively would you say your organization is in making the bulk of its staff feel valued?
To what extent would you say employees of your organization trust each other?
If you think about the way that employees of this organization respond to a standard work challenge, would you say 
that there is a set of ‘shared values’ amongst all the staff?
Out of every ten [10] officers above SGL 7, how many people from this organization participate in groups, committees 
and activities with other people from this organization outside of the formal structure of government (for example, in 
community or social organizations)?
Performance 
Incentives
Table A3: Correlation of Subcomponents of the Project Complexity Indicator
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Project size 0.27 0.45 1.00
Number of inputs 6.82 4.13 0.06 1.00
Number of methods 5.04 2.29 0.33 0.61 1.00
Interdependencies 0.65 0.48 -0.03 0.13 0.07 1.00
Access to raw materials 0.25 0.43 -0.11 -0.24 -0.09 0.04 1.00
Storage of raw materials 0.04 0.21 0.19 -0.05 0.07 0.07 -0.05 1.00
Requires local labor 0.45 0.50 0.31 -0.03 0.48 0.04 0.23 0.14 1.00
Requires skilled labor 0.45 0.50 -0.16 -0.02 -0.21 0.53 0.21 -0.03 0.00 1.00
Access to construction equipment 0.21 0.41 -0.01 -0.24 0.06 0.36 0.62 0.12 0.53 0.53 1.00
Design uncertainty 0.70 0.46 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.77 -0.08 0.02 0.26 0.45 0.31 1.00
Implementation uncertainty 0.78 0.41 0.06 0.26 0.20 0.58 -0.16 -0.01 0.35 0.42 0.24 0.78 1.00
Design ambiguity 0.66 0.47 -0.08 0.08 -0.01 0.84 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.60 0.35 0.73 0.63 1.00
Implementation ambiguity 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.85 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.56 0.36 0.75 0.58 0.89 1.00
Difficulty to manage 0.28 0.45 0.15 -0.16 0.24 0.38 0.47 0.19 0.64 0.37 0.81 0.36 0.27 0.43 0.43 1.00
Number of agencies involved 3.54 0.51 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 0.21 0.11 -0.02 0.25 0.55 0.21 0.39 0.54 0.30 0.26 0.22 1.00
Aggregate complexity 24.98 17.92 0.36 0.24 0.50 0.25 -0.21 0.16 0.39 -0.09 0.03 0.35 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.33 -0.05 1.00
Observations (projects) 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721
Notes: The sample used is those projects in our core analysis for which we have complexity and project completion data. 'Project size' is a binary variable that aims to gauge the physical size of the
project. It takes the value 1 if it is classified as equivalent to a medium scale build or larger. 'Number of inputs' counts the number of distinct product classes the finished project contains. 'Number of
methods' counts the number of distinct disciplines or methods involved in implementing the project. 'Interdependencies' is a binary variable reflecting the extent of interdependencies between the
activities involved in the project. It takes a value of 1 if the project is classified as highly interdependent. 'Access to raw materials' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if raw materials could not
be sourced within the state of implementation. 'Storage of raw materials' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if some of the raw materials could not be easily stored or transported. 'Requires
local labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if local labor was useful or critical. 'Requires skilled labor' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if specialized skills were necessary and
difficult to obtain. 'Access to construction equipment' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the equipment required is difficult to obtain, heavy duty, or difficult to transport to the site. 'Design
uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if the design of the project is context specific. 'Implementation uncertainty' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there are substantial
risks involved in implementation. 'Design ambiguity' is a binary variable that takes on the value 1 if there is a risk of redesign late on in the project. 'Implementation ambiguity' is a binary variable that
takes on the value 1 if the technical risks of the project cannot be fully understood at implementation. 'Difficulty to manage' is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the project is seen have
elements that require project management skills of above average level. 'Number of agencies involved' is simply a count of the estimated number of agencies involved in the project cycle. 'Aggregate
complexity' is a subjective assessment as to the overall complexity of the project by the coding engineers. This variable is an assessment of the interaction of the other variables as well as any
unassessed aspects of complexity and provides a coherent picture of the complexity of the projects by a specialist. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A4: Standard Errors
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
OLS Estimates
(1) Unconditional
(2) Organization 
Controls
(3) Project 
Controls
(4) Project Type 
Fixed Effects
CS-Autonomy 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.18
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.08] [0.02] [0.02] [0.00]
CS-Incentives -0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.14
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.20] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
CS-Other 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.08
Robust standard errors (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Errors clustered by project type within organisation level (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Errors clustered by organisation (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
P-value of clustered coefficients [0.00] [0.20] [0.17] [0.00]
Wild cluster bootstrap p-value of clustered coefficients [0.01] [0.28] [0.26] [0.01]
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls No No Yes Yes
Fixed Effects None None None Project Type
Observations 4721 4721 4721 4721
Notes: Standard errors are in round parentheses, and are robust, clustered by project type within organization, and by organization respectively under the
coefficients corresponding to a management index. Standard p-values and wild cluster bootstrap p-values are in square parentheses below these. All columns
report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed
effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam,
building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an
assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total
budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with
postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day
of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during
Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an
average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A5: Robustness Checks 
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Largest Org. 
by Total Exp.
(2) Org. With 
Most Projects
(3) Ten Orgs. 
with Smallest 
Total Exp.
(4) Ten Orgs. 
with Smallest 
No. of Projects
(5) Orgs. Below 
5% or Above 95% 
of CS-Autonomy 
Scale
(6) Orgs. Below 5% 
or Above 95% of CS-
Performance Scale
(7) Construction 
Projects
(8) Non-
Construction 
Projects
(9) Centralized (10) Decentralized
(11) State-
level Controls
(12) Northern 
Projects
(13) Southern 
Projects
(14) Weighted 
Topics in CS 
Indices
(15) Fractional 
Regression
CS-Autonomy 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 1.02***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.17)
CS-Incentives -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.06* -0.24*** -0.01 -0.14*** -0.12** -0.30*** -0.14*** -0.96***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.10) (0.02) (0.16)
CS-Other 0.09*** 0.05 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.11** 0.06* 0.18*** -0.03 0.08*** -0.03 0.10* 0.08*** 0.49***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.02) (0.15)
Organization Controls 
(capital, general, noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4201 (197) 3924 (192) 4601 (176) 4711 (191) 3810 (145) 4209 (181) 3822 (82) 899 (119) 2434 (53) 2287 (148) 4269 (63) 2049 (91) 1895 (104) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns bar 15 report OLS estimates. Column 15 reports estimates from a fractional regression model. The dependent variable is the proportion of the project completed (that is a continuous measure
between zero and one). Column 1 excludes those projects implemented by the largest organization in terms of total expenditures. Column 2 excludes projects implemented by the largest organization in terms of number of projects. Columns 3 and 4 remove the 10 smallest organizations by expenditures and number of projects respectively. Columns 5 and 6 exclude
organizations at the top and bottom of the CS-autonomy and CS-performance management scales respectively. Column 7 includes only construction projects (borehole, building, electrification, dam, road and canal) and Column 8 includes only non-construction projects. Column 9 restricts our specification to those projects implemented by centralized ministries. Column
10 restricts our specification to those projects implemented by decentralized agencies. In Column 11, "State-level Controls" comprise 'poverty controls', the proportion of households in a state who have difficulty meeting their food needs and the proportion of households that self-classify as poor; 'educational controls', literacy rates for adults and youth, and primary and
secondary net enrolment and completion rates; and 'infrastructure controls', indicators of access to secure tenure, safe water, safe sanitation, improved waste disposal, medical services, vaccinations, electricity, computers, mobile phones and credit facilities, as well as the unemployment rate for over 15s. Column 3 restricts our specification to those projects for which we
have location data and that are implemented in Northern Nigeria, where we exclude the Saturday dummy. Column 4 restricts our specification to those projects for which we have location data and that are implemented in Southern Nigeria. In Column 14 we construct CS-Autonomy and CS-Performance measures by weighting each topic (rather than each variable) equally.
Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by
Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the
seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital
budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A6: Management Practices and the Assignment of Projects to Organizations
Dependent Variable: Binary Variable Indicating Organization Implementing Project
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Conditional Logit Model
(1) Unconstrained 
Pairs
(2) Feasible Pairs 
by Sector
(3) Feasible Pairs 
by Complexity
(4) Organization 
Controls
(5) Project 
Interactions
CS-Autonomy 0.35 0.53* 0.37 0.35 0.40
(0.22) (0.27) (0.24) (0.29) (0.31)
CS-Incentives -0.17 -0.33 -0.26 -0.26 -0.34
(0.26) (0.33) (0.36) (0.45) (0.45)
CS-Other -0.36 -0.02 0.37 0.57 0.63
(0.30) (0.23) (0.31) (0.45) (0.48)
Senior Bureaucrat's Span of Control -0.22 -0.34
(0.35) (0.40)
Tenure of Senior Bureaucrats 0.03 0.05
(0.17) (0.18)
Tenure of Low-tier Bureaucrats -0.03 -0.04
(0.09) (0.09)
Proportion of Senior Bureaucrats That Report Being Intrinsically Motivated -4.82 -4.6
(4.17) (4.37)
Proportion of Low-tier Bureaucrats That Report Being Intrinsically Motivated -0.35 0.06
(3.49) (3.22)
Proportion of Projects that Senior Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt Practices On -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Proportion of Projects that Low-tier Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt Practices On 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.04)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) No No No Yes Yes
Interactions of Project and Organizational Characteristics No No No No Yes
Project-Organization Paired Observations (clusters) 297423 (63) 44429 (59) 33480 (59) 33370 (58) 33370 (58)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All Columns report conditional logit
estimates. The data is set up as follows. For each project, we associate a binary variable with 63 values corresponding to the 63 organizations in the core analysis of the paper. This variable takes the value
one if the project is implemented at that organization, and zero otherwise. Thus, for each of our 4721 projects, we have 63 'project-organization' observations. These 297,423 observations are what makes
up the 'unrestricted pairs' specification in Column 1. The 'feasible pairs' specification in Column 2 restricts the set of organizations associated with a project to only those in the same sector. Those 847
projects implemented at the only organization in the sector drop out in this specification, leaving us with 44,429 project-organization observations. In Columns 4 and 5 as we do not have data for one
organization on the proportion of senior bureaucrats that report observing corrupt practices, this organization drops out, leaving 33,370 project-organization pairs. In Column 5 we restrict the feasible pairs
further by assuming projects can only potentially be assigned to organizations in the same sector that are observed being tasked to implement at least one project of similar or greater complexity. Capital
controls comprise organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with
degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the
day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview,
and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. We follow the grading
system of the Federal Government by defining senior bureaucrats as those on grade level 12 and above. The proportion of staff intrinsically motivated refers to the fraction of employees at an organization
that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?' in the Civil Servants Survey. The percentage of staff who observed corruption
refers to the average proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I observed others breaking the service rules for their own benefit' in the Civil Servants Survey. Figures are rounded to
two decimal places.
Robust Standard Errors
OLS Estimates
(1) Number of 
Projects Assigned 
to Organization
(2) Number of 
Unique Project 
Types Assigned to 
Organization
(3) Project 
Complexity
(4) Log Organizational 
Budget
CS-Autonomy 22.17 0.21 1.56 0.03
(19.57) (0.27) (1.89) (0.05)
CS-Incentives 10.07 -0.01 -0.47 0.05
(24.87) (0.40) (1.53) (0.07)
CS-Other -19.92 -0.01 -2.10 0.03
(28.30) (0.37) (1.66) (0.05)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 63 63 63 63
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable in
Column 1 is a count measure of the number of projects assigned to an organization. In Column 2 it a count variable of the number of unique project types assigned to the
organization, where the projects are assigned a primary classification of the following type: a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole,
dam, building, canal or road project. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the average complexity of projects assigned to the organization. The dependent variable in
Column 4 is the log of the average total organizational budget, averaged over 2006 to 2010. In Columns 1 to 3, capital controls comprise organization-level controls for the
logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. In Column 4, we drop total organizational budget as a control as the log of organizational budget is the
dependent variable. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate
qualifications. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview
was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the
interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for
the years 2006-10. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A7: Management Practices and Public Sector Service Delivery at the Organization 
Level
Table A8: Decomposing the Impacts of Management Practices
Dependent Variable: Proportion Project Completed
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
OLS Estimates
(1) Roles (2) Flexibility
(3) Performance 
incentives
(4) Monitoring (5) Culture (6) Targeting (7) Facilities (8) Skills (9) Staffing (10) All (11) Management
CS-Roles 0.27*** 0.33***
(0.06) (0.04)
CS-Flexibility 0.18*** 0.11**
(0.05) (0.04)
CS-Performance Incentives -0.08* -0.07
(0.04) (0.06)
CS-Monitoring -0.21*** -0.28***
(0.05) (0.06)
CS-Culture 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.03)
CS-Targeting 0.03 0.07
(0.04) (0.05)
CS-Facilities 0.13*** 0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
CS-Skills 0.08 0.14**
(0.07) (0.06)
CS-Staffing -0.06 0.08
(0.07) (0.06)
CS-Management 0.03
(0.03)
H0: CS-Autonomy Components Equal [p-value] [0.00]
H0: CS-Incentives Components Equal [p-value] [0.06]
Organization Controls (capital, 
general, noise)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type Project Type
Observations (clusters) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable in all columns is the proportion
of the project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). All of the index component variables in the table are z-scores which are centered at 0. The variable 'facilities' measures the quality of infrastructure at an organization and the
equipment available to staff. The variable 'skills' measures the skills and training opportunities embodied in the staff body. The variable 'staffing' measures the effective utilization of that body of staff. The variable 'targeting' examines the extent of use of targets.
The variable 'flexibility' measures the extent to which the organization is able to respond to best practice and project peculiarities. The variable 'roles' measures the extent to which staff can play a role in defining the direction of the organization. The variable
'culture' measures whether the organization inculcates a productive work culture. Together these components make up our autonomy variable. The variable 'monitoring' focuses on the tracking of performance of individuals and projects. The variable
'performance' examines the use of incentives both to reward success and punish failure. Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole,
dam, building, canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise
organization-level controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, and the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications.
Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a dummy variable indicating whether
the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-10. At
the foot of the table we report the p-value on the null that the coefficients in Column 10 on the variables that make up the CS-Autonomy measure (those associated with roles and flexibility) are of equal magnitude. We also report the p-value on the null that the
coefficients in Column 10 on the variables that make up the CS-Incentives measure (those associated with performance incentives and monitoring) are of equal magnitude. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Table A9: Bureaucrat Characteristics and Management Practices
Means, standard deviations and regression coefficients
(1) Mean
(s.d.)
(2) Coefficient 
on CS-
Autonomy
(3) Coefficient 
on CS-
Incentives
Proportion of Bureaucrats Who Knew Direct Boss Before Starting Posting 0.00 - -
(0.01)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Who Knew Managers Before Starting Posting 0.00 - -
(0.01)
Average Number of Close Colleagues Known Before Starting Posting 4.40 -0.06 -0.04
(3.18) (0.42) (0.42)
Proportion of Bureaucrats Being the First Family Member to Join Service 0.48 0.02 -0.01
(0.1) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure of Senior Bureaucrats 15 0.42 -0.49
(5) (0.65) (0.65)
Tenure of Low-tier Bureaucrats 10 0.00 -0.48
(4) (0.59) (0.59)
Proportion of Senior Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.31 0.00 -0.02
(0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Proportion of Low-tier Bureaucrats Intrinsically Motivated 0.39 0.01 -0.02
(0.13) (0.02) (0.02)
0.35 -0.02 0.01
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01)
0.41 -0.02 -0.01
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01)
Joint Regression Coefficients
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Columns 2 to 3 report OLS estimates. In Column 1, standard deviations are in parentheses.
In all other columns, standard errors are in parentheses. Proportion of bureaucrats who knew their direct boss before starting their posting is an organization-
level average of those bureaucrats who answered positively to a question outlining possible connections to the officials boss before they came to work at the
organization. Proportion of bureaucrats who knew their managers before starting their posting is an organization-level average of those bureaucrats who
answered positively to a question outlining possible connections to the officials' managers before they came to work at the organization. Average number of
close colleagues known before starting their posting is an organization-level average of the number of colleagues an official stated that they had connections
with before they came to work at the organization. Proportion of bureaucrats being the first family member to join service is an organization-level average of
those bureaucrats who answered 'Yes' to the question 'Are you the first member of your family to enter the Federal service'. Tenure of bureaucrats refers to the
number of years they have served in the organization for. The proportion of staff intrinsically motivated refers to the fraction of employees at an organization
that answered 'The chance to serve Nigeria' to the question 'What most influenced you to take up a career in the service?'. The percentage of staff who
observed corruption refers to the average proportion of projects officials at an organization stated on which 'I observed others breaking the service rules for
their own benefit'. These variables are all elicited from the Civil Servants Survey we conducted. When we control for the proportion of projects that senior
bureaucrats that report observing corrupt practices on, we lose one organization (that implemented a single project) in which no senior bureaucrat answered the
question. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Proportion of Projects that Senior Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt 
Practices On
Proportion of Projects that Low-tier Bureaucrats that Report Observing Corrupt 
Practices On
Dependent Variable: Project Completion Rate
Standard Errors: Clustered by Project Type Within Organization
Interactions in Deviation from Mean
OLS Estimates
(1) Capital to Total 
Budget Ratio
(2) Variance of Ambiguity in 
Portfolio of Projects
CS-Autonomy 0.17*** 0.20***
(0.04) (0.03)
CS-Incentives -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.04) (0.04)
CS-Other 0.07*** 0.04
(0.02) (0.04)
CS-Autonomy x Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.07
(0.10)
CS-Incentives x Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.10
(0.12)
CS-Autonomy x Var (Project Ambiguity) 0.00
(0.02)
CS-Incentives x Var (Project Ambiguity) -0.04
(0.03)
Capital to Total Budget Ratio 0.70
(0.54)
Var (Project Ambiguity) -0.01
(0.03)
Organization Controls (capital, general, noise) Yes Yes
Project Controls Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Project Type Project Type
Observations 4721 (201) 4721 (201)
Table A10: Endogenous Management Practices
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses, and are clustered by
project type within organization throughout. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the proportion of the
project completed (that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Project Type fixed effects relate to whether the primary
classification of the project is as a financial, training, advocacy, procurement, research, electrification, borehole, dam, building,
canal or road project. Project controls comprise project-level controls for the project budget, whether the project is new or a
rehabilitation, and an assessment of its aggregate complexity by Nigerian engineers. Capital controls comprise organization-level
controls for the logs of number of employees, total budget, and capital budget. General controls comprise organization-level
controls for the share of the workforce with degrees, the share of the workforce with postgraduate qualifications, and the span of
control at the organization. Noise controls are four interviewer dummies, indicators of the seniority, gender, and tenure of the
managers who responded, the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of day the interview was conducted, a
dummy variable indicating whether the interview was conducted during Ramadan, the duration of the interview, and an indicator of
the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Total and capital budget figures are an average of organization budget
figures for the years 2006-10. The capital to total budget Ratio is a variable that divides an organization's capital budget by its total
budget. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.
Figure A1: Area of Covariances in Which Coefficients are Underestimated in Absolute Terms
Figure A2: Impact of Management Practices For Different Thresholds of Project Success
Notes: We define a threshold completion rate of p% and then consider all potential thresholds from 1% to 100% in increments of 1%. We then use this to define a
dummy variable for our main empirical specification, where the outcome is a dummy variable equal to one if the project completion rate is above the threshold p%,
and zero otherwise. For any given threshold p the coefficients of interest on CS-Autonomy and CS-Incentives are shown above and their associated 95% confidence
interval.
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